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INTRODUCTION
The Alaska Law Review’s Year in Review is a collection of brief summaries of selected state and
federal appellate cases concerning Alaska law. They are neither comprehensive in breadth, as
several cases are omitted, nor in depth, as many issues within individual cases are omitted.
Attorneys should not rely on these summaries as an authoritative guide; rather, they are intended
to alert the Alaska legal community to judicial decisions from the previous year. The summaries
are grouped by subject matter.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Top
Alaskan Crude Corp. v. State
In Alaskan Crude Corp. v. State,1 the supreme court held that the Oil and Gas Conservation
Commission (“Commission”) can deny an oil and gas exploration facility’s application for an
exemption from oil discharge requirements.2 Alaskan Crude applied to the Commission to
reopen a well for exploration.3 Statutes mandated that oil exploration facilities have a discharge
prevention plan, but exempted gas exploration facilities from the requirement.4 A gas exploration
facility, according to the statutes, has the sole purpose of exploring for natural gas.5 Therefore,
the Commission rejected Alaskan Crude’s request for the discharge exemption because it found
Alaskan Crude’s facility to not be a gas facility.6 On appeal, Alaskan Crude challenged the
Commission’s facility classification.7 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision,
reasoning that a court should defer to an agency’s factual findings supported by substantial
evidence.8 Accordingly, because Alaskan Crude represented that it would explore for oil as well
as gas, and because Alaskan Crude also planned to keep any oil it recovered while exploring for
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gas, the Commission could classify the facility as one not solely used for the exploration of gas.9
Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the Commission can deny an
oil and gas exploration facility’s application for an exemption from oil discharge requirements.10
Bachner Co. v. Weed
In Bachner Co. v. Weed,11 the supreme court held that suits against individual procurement
officers for good-faith acts performed within the course and scope of their official duties are
barred by the exclusive remedy statute.12 Bachner Company and Bowers Investment Company
(together the “Companies”) bid for a state building contract but did not receive it.13 Four
members of the procurement committee for the contract were involved in irregularities while
operating the bid scoring process.14 These irregularities included making untrue statements and
changing scores to correct for perceived bias.15 The Companies sued the committee members in
their individual capacities.16 On appeal, the Companies argued that the exclusive remedy statute
did not bar their suits because the committee members’ conduct demonstrated bad faith.17 The
supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that these particular irregularities
did not indicate bad faith.18 The court further reasoned that, because the acts constituting the
irregularities were performed in the course and scope of the committee members’ official duties,
the Companies’ suits could be characterized as a claim against an agency.19 Affirming the lower
court’s decision, the supreme court held that the exclusive remedy statute bars suits against
individual procurement officers for good-faith acts performed within the course and scope of
their official duties.20
Griswold v. Homer City Council
In Griswold v. Homer City Council,21 the supreme court held that a municipality that expends
significant resources responding to a public records request acts reasonably and in good faith
even when the request is not fully complied with.22 In 2008, the Homer City Council approved a
bond proposition and issued an election brochure to go with it.23 Griswold, alleging the brochure
constituted an illegal use of municipal funds to influence a ballot measure, filed a public records
request for emails and documents relating to the brochure with the City Manager.24 The Manager
9
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eventually produced all of the emails requested, except privileged emails or those that had been
routinely deleted.25 The lower court noted that the Manager need only “make a good faith and
reasonable effort to locate records,” which was supported by the fact that the Manager not only
purchased state of the art record retrieval software but spent nearly six months complying with
Griswold’s request.26 On appeal, Griswold argued that the Manager had not fully complied with
his request, that the email search was inadequate and that the City had unlawfully failed to
preserve public records.27 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, adopting the
aforementioned reasoning as well.28 The court further reasoned that the Manager’s compliance
was reasonable because the Manager had spent approximately fifty hours responding to Griswold
and that it would have cost the city an additional five to ten thousand dollars to fully comply with
Griswold’s request.29 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that where a
municipality expends significant resources responding to a public records request, it does so
reasonably and in good faith even when the request is not fully complied with.30
L Street Investments v. Municipality of Anchorage
In L Street Investments v. Municipality of Anchorage,31 the supreme court held that the voting
requirements of Alaska Statute 29.35.450(c) do not apply to special assessment districts.32 In
1997, the Anchorage Assembly created Special Assessment District 1 SD97. 33 While this
assessment district originally included the building at 420 L Street, a property owned by L Street
Investments, the property was eventually carved out of the district.34 Nevertheless, in 2010, the
Assembly renewed and expanded the district to include the property.35 L Street Investments filed
a complaint for declaratory judgment against the municipality claiming that the voting rules
required by the statute to expand an assessment district were not followed.36 The supreme court
affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that Alaska Statute 29.35.450(c) was inapplicable
to assessment districts since they were creatures of pure municipal law.37 Thus, according to the
court, the statute’s voting requirements did not need to be followed to expand the assessment
district to include L Street Investments’ property.38 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the
supreme court held that the voting requirements of Alaska Statute 29.35.450(c) do not apply to
special assessment districts.39

25

Id.
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 941.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
307 P.3d 965
32
Id. at 973.
33
Id. at 967.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 966–67.
37
Id. at 973.
38
Id.
39
Id.
26

Rollins v. State, Dep’t of Public Safety
In Rollins v. State, Dep’t of Public Safety,40 the supreme court held that the owner of a
commercial liquor license has the burden of proof when challenging a decision from the Alcohol
Beverage Control Board (the “Board”) denying a waiver of the annual operating requirements.41
In 1990, Rollins purchased a liquor license.42 Each year from 1991 to 1994, Rollins applied for,
and was granted, a waiver of the annual operating requirement, which required operation of at
least thirty eight-hour days a year.43 In 1995, Rollins applied again but was denied a waiver by
the Board.44 Rollins sued and eventually agreed to a settlement granting her a waiver for 1995
but barring the issuance of any future waivers without a showing of good cause.45 In 2010,
Rollins applied for another waiver, which the Board denied.46 On appeal, Rollins argued that the
Board should have the burden of proof to show that she had not satisfied the operating
requirement.47 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that having the
requirement waived was a privilege.48 Thus, according to the court, Rollins properly had the
burden of proof to show either that the requirement was met or that there was good cause for it
not being met.49 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the owner of a
commercial liquor licensee has the burden of proof when challenging a decision from the Board
denying a waiver of the annual operating requirements.50
Sosa De Rosario v. Chenega Lodging
In Sosa De Rosario v. Chenega Lodging,51 the supreme court held that in reviewing claims, the
Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission (the “Commission”) must defer to the Workers’
Compensation Board’s (the “Board”) credibility determinations.52 Rosario fell when working at
Chenega Lodging (“Chenega”), experienced a back injury and subsequently received temporary
disability benefit payments from Chenega.53 Rosario’s physician reported that her injury resulted
from her fall at work and that her injury would be chronic.54 However, Chenega’s independent
medical evaluator concluded that Rosario’s condition was caused by age-related degenerative
changes.55 Chenega and Rosario then appeared before the Board, which decided that Rosario did
suffer a compensable work-related injury.56 The Commission later reversed the Board’s decision,
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concluding that there was insufficient evidence to support the Board’s findings.57 On appeal,
Chenega argued that the Board improperly ignored one of its doctor’s testimony during the initial
hearing because it found the doctor’s testimony not credible.58 The supreme court reversed the
Commission’s decision, reasoning that it is the Board’s responsibility to be the fact finder and
determine credibility in these hearings.59 Thus, according to the court, the Commission could not
reverse the Board’s credibility findings as it did here and the doctor’s testimony could be given
little weight.60 Reversing the Commission’s decision, the supreme court held that in reviewing
claims, the Commission must defer to the Board’s credibility determinations.61
State v. Estrada
In State v. Estrada,62 the supreme court held that the Board of Fisheries (the “Board”) may enact
regulations that allow the Department of Fish and Game (the “Department”) to specify
limitations on fishing through the issuance of fishing permits.63 The Board was given authority to
adopt regulations for conserving and developing fisheries.64 Accordingly, it promulgated
regulations that required fishermen to obtain permits from the Department, also giving the
Department authority to impose conditions upon said permits.65 When the Department
discovered that the sockeye salmon population had fallen dangerously low, it reduced the annual
catch limit for sockeye salmon.66 Subsequently, Estrada and two other fishermen were charged
with violating terms of their fishing permits by exceeding this limit.67 On appeal, the fishermen
argued that the Board exceeded its authority by delegating the aforementioned decision-making
to the Department.68 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that courts
should generally defer to an administrative agency’s statutory interpretation.69 Thus, according to
the court, since such challenged authority was ultimately a question of legislative intent, the
Board’s interpretation must prevail since analogous authority had been exercised without
intervention from the legislature for decades.70 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme
court held that the Board may enact regulations that allow the Department to specify limitations
on fishing through the Department’s issuance of fishing permits.71
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BUSINESS LAW
Top
Brown v. Knowles
In Brown v. Knowles,72 the supreme court held that an employee’s veil-piercing claim is not
barred during the corporation’s bankruptcy proceedings.73 Brown, the sole shareholder of
International Steel, entered into an agreement with Knowles, an employee, for a bonus
compensation package but eventually stopped paying.74 Knowles subsequently filed suit against
International Steel and Brown in the lower court one day before International Steel filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.75 In the lower court, Knowles received a monetary award.76
On appeal, Brown argued that Knowles’ veil-piercing claim was barred by International Steel’s
bankruptcy proceedings.77 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that
International Steel, and not Brown, was the debtor in the bankruptcy proceedings.78 Thus,
according to the court, since the veil-piercing claim was against Brown and not the corporation,
Brown was not entitled to bankruptcy protection since he never filed for bankruptcy.79 Affirming
the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that an employee’s veil-piercing claim is not
barred during the corporation’s bankruptcy proceedings.80
McCarter v. McCarter
In McCarter v. McCarter,81 the supreme court held that, without filing a motion for relief from
judgment, the court will not modify an agreement that has previously been incorporated into a
final dissolution decree.82 Deborah McCarter filed a motion in the lower court for enforcement of
a property agreement that was incorporated into her divorce decree with her ex-husband,
David.83 The lower court granted Deborah’s motion.84 On appeal, David argued that, due to
inaccuracies contained in the agreement, the lower court erred in failing to modify it.85 The
supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the court could not modify the
contract on a piecemeal basis when the parties’ property rights had previously been adjudicated
and incorporated into a final judgment.86 Thus, without a separate filing of a motion for relief
from judgment, the court’s job was to interpret and enforce the agreement based on the principles
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of contract law.87 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the court will
not modify an agreement that has previously been incorporated into a final dissolution decree
without the filing of a motion for relief from judgment.88
Tesoro Corp. v. State, Dep’t of Revenue
In Tesoro Corp. v. State, Dep’t of Revenue,89 the supreme court held that parent corporations
maintaining significant oversight of its subsidiaries are subject to taxation under the unitary
business apportionment method.90 Between 1969 and 1994, Tesoro’s operations in Alaska were
treated as a unitary business and taxed as such.91 However in 1995, its purchase of the Kenai
Pipeline (“KPL”) made Tesoro “engaged in the transportation of oil or gas by pipeline,”
subjecting itself to additional taxation.92 To avoid some of this new tax, Tesoro claimed that
some of its subsidiaries (including KPL) were not unitary and, accordingly, only those nonunitary business segments were subject to this additional tax.93 On appeal, Tesoro argued that the
administrative law judge erred because of the corporation’s passive investment approach
regarding the aforementioned subsidiaries.94 The supreme court affirmed the administrative
judge’s decision, reasoning that Tesoro’s provision of credit facilities, financing, oversight,
guidance and central management to its subsidiaries rendered it, and all of the subsidiaries at
issue, a unitary business.95 These interactions, according to the court, demonstrated Tesoro’s
continued control and influence over its subsidiaries, which resulted in considerable savings.96
Affirming the administrative law judge’s decision, the supreme court held that parent
corporations maintaining significant oversight of its subsidiaries are subject to taxation under the
unitary business apportionment method.97
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Top
Alaskan Adventure Tours v. City and Borough of Yakutat
In Alaskan Adventure Tours v. City and Borough of Yakutat,98 the supreme court held that when
ruling on a motion for relief from judgment based on fraud, the lower court may require a
showing that the fraud could not have been discovered by due diligence before or during trial.99
In 2010, Yakutat filed suit against Adventure Tours for fraudulent conveyance of its assets to
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avoid payment of taxes that it owed.100 After finding that Adventure Tours had notice that it
owed taxes at the time it transferred the assets, the lower court ruled against them.101
Subsequently, Adventure Tours motioned the court for relief from this judgment under Rule
60(b)(3), claiming that one of Yakutat’s witnesses had lied about a conversation with the owner
of Adventure Tours.102 This conversation was one of the ways that Yakutat had demonstrated
Adventure Tours had notice of the taxes it owed prior to transferring the assets.103 On appeal,
Adventure Tours argued that the lower court had applied the wrong standard by requiring them
to prove that the fraud could not have been timely shown during the fraudulent conveyance
trial.104 The supreme affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that Rule 60(b)(3) was not
meant to be a backup plan for litigants that failed to adequately investigate their case or crossexamine an adverse witness the first time around.105 Rather, Rule 60(b)(3) was meant to provide
relief for parties who were unable to fully and fairly litigate their original case.106 Affirming the
lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that when a movant had ample opportunity to
uncover or demonstrate the alleged fraud or perjury during trial, relief under Rule 60(b)(3) may
be denied.107
American Marine Corp. v. Sholin
In American Marine Corp. v. Sholin,108 the supreme court held that the State’s savings statute
does not require timely notice.109 In 2005, Sholin was provided medical services by American
Marine Corporation (the “Corporation”).110 The Corporation asserted that Sholin’s insurer had
given them oral authorization to provide the services.111 Nevertheless, Sholin’s insurer
subsequently denied the Corporation’s requests for payment.112 In response, the Corporation
commenced an action for breach of contract against Sholin and her insurer.113 The lower court
initially dismissed the claim for lack of service, prompting the Corporation to re-file the lawsuit
almost a full year later.114 The lower court then granted summary judgment to the defendant
since the defendant was not notified of the Corporation’s initial claim until after the statute of
limitations had run.115 On appeal, the Corporation argued that the plain meaning of the savings
statute allowed for a timely filed action not dismissed on its merits to be re-filed within one year
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of the initial action regardless of timely notice.116 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s
decision, reasoning that the savings statute plainly did not require timely notice.117 The court
further reasoned that the purpose of the savings statute was to “facilitate resolution of suits on the
merits.”118 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the State’s savings
statute does not require timely notice.119
Bearden v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
In Bearden v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,120 the supreme court held that pleading no
contest to a disorderly conduct charge collaterally estops re-litigating the essential elements of
that crime in a civil declaratory judgment action regarding insurance coverage.121 After a
physical altercation with an acquaintance, Bearden pled no contest to disorderly conduct, which
is a serious criminal offense.122 A civil complaint stemming from the same incident was
subsequently filed against Bearden who, in turn, looked to his insurance for coverage.123 On
appeal, Bearden argued that he acted in self-defense.124 The supreme court affirmed the lower
court’s decision, reasoning that pleading no contest when given the opportunity for a full and fair
hearing necessarily meant the absence of self-defense had been decided.125 Thus, according to
the court, Bearden could not rely on the insurance policy for coverage.126 Affirming the lower
court’s decision, the supreme court held that pleading no contest to a disorderly conduct charge
collaterally estops re-litigating the essential elements of that crime in a civil declaratory
judgment action regarding insurance coverage.127
Chloe O. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services
In Chloe O. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services,128 the supreme court held that when
reviewing a lower court’s holding that was made during a new hearing, review is based only on
the evidence before the court during the new hearing.129 The Office of Children Service (“OCS”)
filed suit to terminate Chloe’s parental rights based on her history of drug abuse, suicide
attempts, violent behavior and her predilection towards unsafe people and situations.130 After a
trial, the lower court terminated Chloe’s rights.131 Chloe appealed but during briefing before the
supreme court, the parties agreed that the case should be remanded because the lower court had
116
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applied the wrong evidentiary standard to the question of whether OCS had made active efforts
to reunify the family.132 On remand, before a new judge, Chloe asked for and was granted a new
evidentiary hearing.133 Ultimately, the lower court in the new hearing determined, by clear and
convincing evidence, that OCS had made extraordinary efforts to reunify the family.134 On
appeal, Chloe argued that the lower court erred because it ignored the testimony of a witness
from the first hearing.135 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that
the witness’ testimony was not before the lower court when it made its ruling on remand.136
Furthermore, Chloe was adamant that the new judge “not base her decision on a review of the
evidence presented to” the first judge.137 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court
held that when reviewing a lower court’s holding that was made during a new hearing, review is
based only on the evidence before the court during the new hearing.138
Dixon v. Blackwell
In Dixon v. Blackwell139, the supreme court held that an ambiguous statement in a closing
argument does not constitute a judicial admission.140 After failing to reach an agreement in
arbitration regarding payment of her medical expenses, Dixon filed a complaint against
Blackwell.141 At trial, Blackwell’s attorney estimated that Dixon’s related medical expenses
could be around $17,955, but the jury awarded only $12,710.142 On appeal, Dixon argued that
Blackwell’s attorney’s estimation of medical expenses constituted a judicial admission and
because the jury’s verdict was lower than the estimated amount, the amount awarded must
necessarily be inadequate.143 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning
that a judicial admission must be “clear, deliberate, and unequivocal.”144 Here, according to the
court, if Blackwell’s attorney’s estimation of medical expenses is taken in context, it did not
meet the aforementioned standard for judicial admissions and, therefore, could not establish the
inadequacy of the awarded amount.145 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court
held that an ambiguous statement in a closing argument does not constitute a judicial
admission.146
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Hill v. Giani
In Hill v. Giani,147 the supreme court held that summary judgment is inappropriate where the
movant is protected by qualified official immunity subject to a good faith requirement and the
nonmovant presents some admissible evidence that the official acted in bad faith.148 Giani, an
independent care coordinator for the State Department of Health and Social Services, filed a
Report of Harm (the “Report”) against Hill, the owner of an assisted living home for mentally
handicapped adults, alleging various forms of abuse.149 However, while an investigation into the
Report revealed that some allegations contained therein were valid, there was no evidence to
substantiate the abuse allegations.150 Subsequently, Hill filed suit against Giani alleging
defamation and various other claims.151 The lower court granted summary judgment for Giani on
the basis of statutory immunity.152 On appeal, Giani argued that the investigation proved the
validity of some of the allegations and, in turn, demonstrated Giani’s good faith in filing the
report.153 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the investigation
was not relevant to the issue of Giani’s personal good faith in filing the Report.154 The court
further reasoned that Hill provided some admissible evidence that could show bad faith by Giani
in filing the Report.155 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that
summary judgment is inappropriate where the movant is protected by qualified official immunity
subject to a good faith requirement and the nonmovant provides some admissible evidence of
bad faith.156
Patterson v. Infinity Insurance Co.
In Patterson v. Infinity Insurance Co.,157 the supreme court held that a claim mentioned but not
explicitly asserted as a claim in one lawsuit sometimes may not be barred by res judicata in a
second suit.158 In 2008, Patterson sued Infinity Insurance Co. (“Infinity”), claiming that they
acted in bad faith by failing to timely pay some of Patterson’s medical bills after a car
accident.159 The lower court granted Infinity’s motion for summary judgment but noted that the
embezzlement claim that Patteron’s complaint mentioned did not relate to the underlying claims
and, consequently, would not be considered.160 Six months later, Patterson filed a new suit that
specifically included the embezzlement claim.161 On appeal, Infinity argued that Patterson’s new
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suit was barred by res judicata.162 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision,
reasoning that Patterson’s embezzlement claim dealt with a distinct harm from that alleged in the
first suit.163 It was distinct because although there would be some overlapping evidence, the new
claim did not stem from conduct resulting from the car accident.164 Reversing the lower court’s
decision, the supreme court held that a claim mentioned but not explicitly asserted as a claim in
one lawsuit sometimes may not be barred by res judicata in a second suit.165
Jackson v. Sey
In Jackson v. Sey,166 the supreme court held that a post-judgment motion for relief from
judgment is not subject to dismissal for lack of prosecution under Rule 41(e).167 In 2008, the
lower court granted a divorce to Sey and her husband Jackson after Jackson failed to appear at a
hearing telephonically from jail.168 Jackson subsequently filed a motion for relief from judgment,
which would relieve him of the issued divorce obligations.169 While the lower court allowed
limited discovery into the issue, the court ultimately dismissed the motion for lack of
prosecution.170 On appeal, Jackson argued the lower court erred in not considering the merits of
his aforementioned motion.171 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning
that lack of prosecution under Rule 41(e) only applies to pending cases.172 Thus, according to the
court, since a final judgment was entered, there could be no lack of prosecution of a pending
case.173 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that a post-judgment
motion for relief from judgment is not subject to dismissal for lack of prosecution under Rule
41(e).174
Schultz v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
In Schultz v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,175 the supreme court held that only a favorable verdict, not
the most desired verdict, is necessary to be the prevailing party entitled to attorneys’ fees under
Alaska Civil Rule 82.176 The Trust Advisory Committee (the “Committee”) sought information
on its property insurance premiums and coverage from its trustee, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
(“Wells Fargo”).177 Unsatisfied with Wells Fargo’s responses, the Committee petitioned the
lower court for relief and its attorneys’ fees, arguing that by failing to provide requested
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information, Wells Fargo breached its fiduciary duty.178 The lower court ultimately found that
neither party had clearly prevailed in the action and, consequently, did not award the Committee
its attorneys’ fees.179 On appeal, the Committee argued that the lower court misinterpreted
Alaska Civil Rule 82.180 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that
the prevailing party in a civil suit was the party who received a favorable verdict on the case’s
main issue.181 Here, since the Committee successfully obtained a court order compelling Wells
Fargo to fulfill its fiduciary obligations by surrendering the insurance policy as well as half of the
Committee’s requested documents, it was the prevailing party entitled to attorneys’ fees.182
Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that only a favorable verdict is
necessary to be the prevailing party entitled to attorneys’ fees under Alaska Civil Rule 82.183
Steven v. Nicole
In Steven v. Nicole,184 the supreme court held that a court does not abuse its discretion in refusing
to cede jurisdiction as an inconvenient forum in a visitation dispute under the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”) if it provides sufficient reasoning to
infer that it considered the relevant statutory factors.185 Following the couple’s divorce in 2004,
and in contravention of Nicole’s visitation rights, Steven refused to allow Nicole to take the
children from Tennessee in May 2012.186 Nicole filed a motion in Alaska to enforce her
visitation rights but failed to pass a timely drug test in order to get custody of the children.187 The
lower court held that Nicole could enforce her rights over Christmas if she passed a drug test one
month in advance.188 On appeal, Steven claimed that the lower court should have voluntarily
ceded jurisdiction as an inconvenient forum to Tennessee.189 The supreme court affirmed the
lower court’s decision, reasoning that a court must articulate why a motion for inconvenient
forum was denied under the UCCJEA by use of the established statutory factors.190 Thus,
according to the court, the lower court’s explanation, while not explicitly referring to the
aforementioned factors, was satisfactory because it demonstrated that the factors had been
considered.191 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that a court does not
abuse its discretion in refusing to grant an inconvenient forum motion in a visitation dispute
under the UCCJEA if it provides sufficient reasoning to infer that it considered the relevant
statutory factors.192
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Top
Barber v. State, Dep’t of Corrections
In Barber v. State, Dep’t of Corrections,193 the supreme court held that requiring a prisoner to
pay filing fees in order to appeal a Department of Corrections (“DOC”) disciplinary proceeding
is a denial of the prisoner’s due process rights when that prisoner has an actual inability to pay.194
Barber sought judicial review of two DOC disciplinary proceedings.195 His appeals were rejected
because he was unable to pay even the reduced filing fee required by the court.196 On appeal,
Barber argued that the filing fee statute deprived him of his due process rights.197 The supreme
court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that Barber had a due process interest in
avoiding punitive segregation and in obtaining judicial review of his DOC proceedings.198 The
court further reasoned that without judicial review there was a significant risk of erroneous
deprivation of his interests and that the state’s legitimate interest in reducing frivolous prisoner
litigation did not justify denying Barber his due process right of access to courts.199 Reversing
the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that it is a denial of due process to require a
prisoner to pay filing fees that he is actually unable to afford.200
Blaufuss v. Ball
In Blaufuss v. Ball,201 the supreme court held that due process rights are not violated by a
decision based purely on non-expert testimony when proper notice is received and both parties
have the opportunity to present their own evidence.202 In 2006, Ball filed for divorce from
Blaufuss.203 At trial, Ball stated that he had supported Blaufuss for a number of years while
separated but argued that he should no longer be required to do so because of Blaufuss’ ability to
hold a job as well as her drug abuse problems.204 Blaufuss’ sister, however, explained that
Blaufuss suffered from a documented mental illness and was in dire economic straights but
provided no supporting documentation.205 The trial court found that Blaufuss suffered from
mental illness and chronic substance abuse, and, consequently, found her unemployable.206
Accordingly, Ball was ordered to pay Blaufuss spousal support.207 In 2010, after not receiving
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her payments, Blaufuss moved to find Ball in contempt of court.208 In response, Ball argued he
had been deprived of due process at the divorce trial because the trial court made its decision
without any financial or medical documentation supporting Blaufuss’ allegations.209 The lower
court agreed with Ball’s due process argument.210 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s
decision, reasoning that because Ball had received proper notice of the issues to be decided at
trial and, furthermore, was not barred from presenting his own evidence at trial, his due process
rights were not violated by the trial court’s ruling.211 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the
supreme court held that due process rights are not violated by a ruling based purely on nonexpert testimony when proper notice is received and both parties have the opportunity to present
their own evidence.212
Debra P. v. Laurence S.
In Debra P. v. Laurence S.,213 the supreme court held that changing a child custody hearing to a
final trial without proper notice violates due process.214 Debra P. and Laurence S. were in dispute
over who should have legal and physical custody of their child.215 The lower court judge ordered
an evidentiary hearing on September 21 for an interim order, allowing Debra P. and Laurence S.
more time to work towards a settlement.216 However, at the September 21 hearing, the court
granted Laurence S. custody and announced that its order would be final.217 On appeal, Debra P.
argued that the lower court denied her the opportunity to fully present her case by changing the
hearing to a final custody trial without giving proper, prior notice.218 The supreme court reversed
the lower court’s decision, reasoning that procedural due process required that parties receive
proper, prior notice in custody hearings.219 Here, the lower court’s comments would have led
most people to believe only interim custody would be determined at the September 21 hearing
and the lower court only told the parties its intention to make a final ruling after both parties had
made their presentations.220 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that
changing a child custody hearing to a final trial without proper notice violates due process.221
DesJarlais v. State, Office of the Lieutenant Governor
In DesJarlais v. State, Office of the Lieutenant Governor,222 the supreme court held that the
lieutenant governor properly refuses to certify a citizen-proposed initiative when it is clearly
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unconstitutional.223 DesJarlais submitted an initiative to the Office of the Lieutenant Governor
that would result in a general ban on abortion.224 The Lieutenant Governor consulted the
Department of Law and concluded that the initiative was unconstitutional and therefore did not
circulate it.225 DesJarlais then filed a complaint in the lower court.226 The lower court granted
summary judgment to the State because a law banning abortion was clearly unconstitutional
under controlling federal and state precedents.227 On appeal, DesJarlais argued that Roe v. Wade
was not controlling precedent and that the Alaska Constitution required the State to protect the
natural rights of all people, including preborn children.228 The supreme court affirmed the lower
court’s decision, reasoning that the initiative was clearly unconstitutional under controlling
federal and state precedents.229 Accordingly, stated the court, the lieutenant governor could not
act against an established constitutional right and therefore properly denied to circulate the
initiative.230 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the lieutenant
governor properly refuses to certify a citizen-proposed initiative when it is clearly
unconstitutional.231
Heller v. Dep’t of Revenue
In Heller v. Dep’t of Revenue,232 the supreme court held that the six-month residency
requirements necessary to be eligible for the Permanent Fund Dividend (“PFD”) cannot be
circumvented even when absence is involuntary.233 In 2005, Heller, a military member, was
posted in Alaska and subsequently took several steps to establish residency.234 Following
deployment on August 14, 2005, he did not return to Alaska until December 11, 2006.235 In
2007, Heller applied for a PFD but was denied for failing to satisfy the six consecutive month
residency requirement.236 On appeal, Heller argued that his deployment was an “allowable
absence” under the eligibility requirements.237 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s
decision, reasoning that Heller’s interpretation ran contrary to both the plain language of the
statute as well as its underlying legislative intent.238 Because the legislature sought to prevent
potential abuses of the PFD by those with no intention of becoming permanent residents of
Alaska, the court concluded that the residency requirements could not be circumvented even
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when absence from the state was involuntary.239 The court further reasoned that the eligibility
requirements were constitutional because they facilitated the State’s interest in ensuring that only
bona fide residents received PFD payments.240 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme
court held that the six-month residency requirements necessary to be eligible for the Permanent
Fund Dividend (“PFD”) cannot be circumvented even when absence is involuntary.241
Moore v. State
In Moore v. State,242 the court of appeals held that the State’s sexual abuse statute criminalizing
sexually enticing minors online is constitutional.243 Moore was convicted of online enticement of
a minor under the sexual abuse statute after he asked two chat room participants, police officers
posing as fourteen-year-old girls, to masturbate for him.244 Moore appealed his conviction,
arguing that the online enticement statute was unconstitutional because it restricted free
speech.245 The statute forbids an adult from enticing, soliciting or encouraging either a child
under age sixteen or a person that the offender believes is under age sixteen from engaging in
sexual activities with him or her.246 The court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision,
reasoning that speech restrictions must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government
interest.247 Here, the State has a compelling interest in protecting minors from online sexual
predators.248 Furthermore, the statue is not overbroad because it requires the State to prove that
the offender intended to cause the child to engage in sexual conduct.249 Affirming the lower
court’s decision, the court of appeals held that the State’s sexual abuse statute criminalizing
sexually enticing minors online is constitutional.250
Patrick v. Municipality of Anchorage
In Patrick v. Municipality of Anchorage,251 the supreme court held that due process does not
always require a full pre-revocation hearing when an informal opportunity to respond to
allegations is presented prior to a license revocation.252 After Patrick, a taxi-driver, was cited for
driving with a suspended license, she repeatedly communicated with the transportation inspector
charged with investigating the violation, arguing that she was not driving the vehicle that
night.253 Nevertheless, the transportation inspector revoked her chauffeur license based on his
classification of her as a chronic violator.254 Patrick requested a hearing where her license
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revocation was reaffirmed.255 On appeal, Patrick argued that her due process rights were violated
because her license was revoked prior to a hearing.256 The supreme court affirmed the lower
court’s decision, reasoning that Patrick’s conversations with the transportation satisfied due
process in this instance by giving her sufficient notice that her license was going to be revoked as
well as an opportunity to respond to the evidence against her.257 Affirming the lower court’s
decision, the supreme court held that due process does not always require a full pre-revocation
hearing when an informal opportunity to respond to allegations is presented prior to a license
revocation.258
State v. Doe A
In State v. Doe A,259 the supreme court held that decisions by two-to-one majorities of the
supreme court prior to November 10, 2010, have precedential effect because Appellate Rule
106(b) does not apply retroactively.260 In 2008, the supreme court held in a two-to-one decision
that amendments made in 1998 by the Alaska Legislature to Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration
Act (“ASORA”) violated the State’s Ex Post Facto Clause and, accordingly, could not apply to
individuals who committed their crimes before those amendments became effective.261 On
November 10, 2010, Appellate Rule 106(b) was promulgated, providing that two-to-one
decisions of the supreme court did not have precedential effect.262 John Doe A and John Doe B
were convicted prior to the 1998 amendments of separate crimes requiring them to register and
comply with ASORA.263 After Appellate Rule 106(b) was promulgated, they challenged the
application of the 1998 amendments to them on the same Ex Post Facto grounds.264 On appeal,
the State argued that Appellate Rule 106(b) should be given retroactive effect, thus eliminating
the precedential value of the 2008 case, because it was a procedural rule and because its postadoption history demonstrated retroactivity was intended.265 The supreme court affirmed the
lower court’s decision, reasoning that Appellate Rule 106(b) was substantive since retroactively
eliminating two-to-one decisions as precedent would eliminate rights created by those decisions,
implicate public policy decisions and affect the results of future litigants’ cases.266 The supreme
court further reasoned that the post-adoption history did not clearly indicate an express intent of
retroactive application.267 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that
decisions by two-to-one majorities of the supreme court prior to Appellate Rule 106(b)’s
promulgation have precedential effect.268
255

Id. at 297.
Id.
257
Id. at 300.
258
Id.
259
297 P.3d 885 (Alaska 2013).
260
Id. at 886.
261
Id.
262
Id. at 888.
263
Id. at 886.
264
Id. at 885–86.
265
Id. at 889.
266
Id. at 890.
267
Id. at 891.
268
Id. at 886.
256

Sullivan v. Resisting Envtl. Destruction on Indigenous Lands
In Sullivan v. Resisting Envtl. Destruction on Indigenous Lands,269 the supreme court held that
land development statutes limiting the State’s evaluation duty to only a single best interest
finding (a “BIF”) are constitutional.270 In evaluating the Beaufort Sea Lease Sale Area for
potential development, the Department of Natural Resources (the “Department”) issued a single
BIF in favor of disposing of the land beginning with a phase of lease sales.271 The Department’s
actions were pursuant to a recently amended statute that permitted the State to evaluate the
environmental, cultural and communal effects of developing land only so far as this first phase of
leasing was concerned.272 Subsequently, Resisting Environmental Destruction on Indigenous
Lands (“REDOIL”) successfully petitioned the lower court, arguing that the statute was
unconstitutional because it did not require subsequent BIFs at each phase of develop.273 On
appeal, the Department argued that the lower court erred in finding that the statute contravened
the Alaska Constitution.274 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that
under the Alaska Constitution the Department’s only duty was to maximize the benefit to
Alaskans in developing the State’s resources.275 Thus, according to the court, since BIFs were
mere legislative conventions to achieve this end, the legislature had broad, constitutional
discretion to limit them to the first phase of development.276 Reversing the lower court’s
decision, the supreme court held that land development statutes limiting the State’s evaluation
duty to only a single BIF are constitutional.277
Titus v. State, Dep’t of Administration
In Titus v. State, Dep’t of Administration,278 the supreme court held that suspending a driver’s
license for failure to carry liability insurance after involvement in a single-vehicle accident was
not a violation of equal protection, substantive due process or procedural due process.279 In 2008,
Titus was involved in a single motorcycle accident, resulting in minor personal injuries and
damage to his motorcycle.280 Titus told the responding officer that he had insurance coverage.281
However, the Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) subsequently notified Titus, who in fact
did not have insurance, that his license would be suspended for ninety days after failing to
provide proof of insurance within fifteen days of the accident.282 The DMV hearing officer
ultimately suspended Titus’ license and the lower court upheld this decision.283 On appeal, Titus
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argued that the suspension was a violation of equal protection as well as substantive and
procedural due processes.284 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, noting that
the purpose of the proof-of-insurance statute was to discover and deter uninsured driving.285 The
court reasoned that there was no equal protection issue because all drivers were required to have
insurance.286 The court further reasoned that substantive and procedural due processes were not
violated as the failure to carry liability insurance was related to a person’s fitness to drive.287
Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that suspending a driver’s license
for failure to carry liability insurance in a single-vehicle accident was not a violation of equal
protection, substantive due process or procedural due process.288
CONTRACT LAW
Top
Brooks v. Hollaar
In Brooks v. Hollaar,289 the supreme court held that the named payee on a promissory note has
an economic interest in repayment and thus has standing to sue to collect on the loan regardless
of the loan’s proceeds origination.290 Between 2005 and 2006, Hollaar loaned $266,430 to
Brooks and his wife in a series of four promissory notes.291 Initially, the money for the loans
belonged to Hollaar’s father, mother and sister.292 They transferred the funds into Hollaar’s bank
account and he then transferred the funds to Brooks.293 Brooks failed to repay the loans within
the notes’ allotted time frames and Hollaar filed suit in 2009 in order to recover his losses.294 The
lower court entered judgment in Hollaar’s favor on all four promissory notes.295 On appeal,
Brooks argued that because the money for the loans did not originate from Hollaar’s bank
account, he had no economic interest in the performance of the notes and could only sue for
nominal damages, not full contract damages.296 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s
decision, reasoning that Hollaar’s economic interest arose from his status as named payee on the
promissory notes.297 The court further reasoned that Brooks’ contention was irrelevant because
Hollaar was the funds transferor for all four notes as well.298 Affirming the lower court’s
decision, the supreme court held that the named payee on a promissory note has an economic
interest in repayment and thus has standing to sue to collect on the loan.299
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Calais Company, Inc. v. Ivy
In Calais Company, Inc. v. Ivy,300 the supreme court held that appraisers must comply with
appraisal provisions in a settlement agreements.301 Calais Company (the “Company”) and
shareholder Ivy reached a settlement agreement in which the Company would buy Ivy’s shares at
a value to be determined by a panel of three appraisers.302 The three appraisers differed in their
valuations, two ignoring liabilities and just calculating the fair market value of the Company.303
On appeal, the Company argued that the two aforementioned appraisers’ valuations did not
comply with the settlement agreement.304 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision,
reasoning that the settlement agreement contained plain language that the Company’s value was
to be determined in accordance with Alaska Statute 10.06.630(a).305 Thus, according to the court,
the two appraisers’ valuations did not comply with the settlement agreement because liquidation
costs should have been considered when determining this value.306 Reversing the lower court’s
decision, the supreme court held that appraisers must comply with appraisal provisions in a
settlement agreements.307
Charles v. Stout
In Charles v. Stout,308 the supreme court held that a passenger is not an intended third party
beneficiary of an insurance policy provided by a lender to protect the property that secures their
loan.309 Charles was injured in a car accident where he was the passenger in Stout’s car.310 In
addition to suing Stout, Charles also sued Credit Union 1, the lender and lienholder for the
vehicle.311 The loan agreement between Credit Union 1 and Stout provided that Stout would
maintain liability insurance but Credit Union 1 would have the right to obtain insurance if Stout
failed to do so.312 The agreement further stated that any insurance procured by Credit Union 1
would be primarily to protect Credit Union 1 rather than Stout.313 On appeal, Stout argued that he
was an intended third party beneficiary of the insurance policy that Credit Union 1 contracted to
provide and he is therefore entitled to recover under that policy.314 The supreme court affirmed
the lower court’s decision, reasoning that there was no written agreement compelling Credit
Union 1 to provide liability coverage for the benefit of Stout.315 The court further reasoned that
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there was no evidence Charles was an intended third party beneficiary of the aforementioned
coverage.316 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that a passenger is not
an intended third party beneficiary of an insurance policy provided by a lender to protect the
property that secures their loan.317
Fernandez v. Fernandez
In Fernandez v. Fernandez,318 the supreme court held that, if so provided by the terms of a
settlement agreement, parties can return to “square one” after being unable to, in good faith,
fulfills the antecedent terms of the agreement.319 After David and Cynthia separated, they
reached a settlement where Cynthia would pay David $33,000 through a second mortgage on her
home.320 However, if Cynthia could not obtain the mortgage, the parties would negotiate an
alternative payment plan in good faith; if no agreement resulted, they would return to “square
one” and figure things out from that point.321 When this point was reached, the lower court
imposed settlement terms upon Cynthia instead of allowing her to return to “square one.”322 On
appeal, she argued the lower court had no authority to do that because the parties merely agreed
to negotiate, not agree.323 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that
in an agreement to negotiate, parties retained the right to refuse proposed terms.324 In their
settlement, Cynthia and David had not established a specific negotiation process, method of
settling disputes or agreed a court could dictate settlement terms.325 Reversing the lower court’s
decision, the supreme court held that under the parties’ settlement agreement, a party could
return to “square one” after being unable to, in good faith, fulfill the antecedent terms of the
agreement.326
Hussein-Scott v. Scott
In Hussein-Scott v. Scott,327 the supreme court held that the more important or principal clause
controls in determining the meaning of an ambiguous divorce settlement agreement.328 Jerry
Scott and Camilla Hussein-Scott dissolved their marriage and the court adopted by reference a
form settlement completed by Jerry and reviewed by Camilla.329 On the line supposedly
designating the end date for spousal support payments, Jerry indicated that payment would end
on December 2, 2020, which was the eighteenth birthday of the couple’s youngest daughter.330
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On a subsequent line designated for other specifics, Jerry indicated that payment would end on
the couple’s middle daughter’s birthday, which was August 1, 2015.331 The lower court reasoned
that words should prevail over numbers and held that Jerry’s obligation to pay spousal support
ended on the eighteenth birthday of the middle daughter.332 On appeal, Jerry argued that the
lower court’s factual finding that he was less likely to make an error in writing a child’s name
than in writing the date of a child’s birthday should be given deference.333 The supreme court
reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the determination of the lower court was not
factual and that the principle that words control over numbers did not apply here because it only
applies to contracts that resemble commercial agreements.334 The court further reasoned that the
written date was both more important because of its location on the form and because it appeared
first on the form.335 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the more
important or principal clause controls in determining the meaning of an ambiguous divorce
settlement agreement.336
Madonna v. Tamarack Air, Ltd.
In Madonna v. Tamarack Air, Ltd.,337 the supreme court held that an airplane maintenance
company does not have a contractual duty to repair a plane that was damaged on its airfield after
completion of a routine maintenance inspection.338 Madonna brought his airplane to Tamarack
Air, Ltd. (“Tamarack”) for a routine inspection, after which Tamarack damaged the plane while
it sat on the company’s airfield.339 Offering to repair the plane, Tamarack estimated the costs
with Madonna, who rejected their offer in favor of personally arranging the repairs.340 On appeal,
Madonna challenged the lower court’s entry of summary judgment dismissing his claim that
Tamarack had a contractual obligation to repair the damage it caused.341 The supreme court
affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that since Madonna had brought his plane to
Tamarack for maintenance, it only had a contractual duty to fix problems arising during the
inspection.342 The inspection had been completed before the damaged occurred, so no such
obligation to repair that damage existed.343 Furthermore, having rejected Tamarack’s repair offer,
Madonna could not reasonably argue it had breached a duty to repair, unless he also conceded
that Tamarack had to continually submit repair plans until he was satisfied, which would be an
unenforceable contractual duty because of its indefinite and uncertain terms.344 Affirming the
lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that an airplane maintenance company does not
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have a contractual duty to repair an airplane that was damaged on its airfield after completion of
a routine maintenance inspection.345
Nautilus Marine Enters. v. Exxon Mobil Corp.
In Nautilus Marine Enters. v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,346 the supreme court held that extrinsic
evidence is admissible for interpreting the meaning of the words of a contract even when the
language is not ambiguous.347 In 2006, Nautilus Marine and Exxon Mobil entered into a
Settlement Agreement originating from a prior lawsuit.348 The parties, however, could not agree
whether the prejudgment interest should be a simple or compound rate.349 Nautilus’ attorney
subsequently suggested the parties settle the principal damages and allow the court to determine
the proper prejudgment interest.350 The settlement agreement ultimately included language to the
effect that interest would be “compounded annually.”351 Nevertheless, both parties agreed that
there was no discussion about the meaning of “compounded annually.”352 On appeal, Nautilus
argued that the parol evidence rule barred the court from considering extrinsic evidence for
determining the meaning of the Settlement Agreement unless the language of the contract was
ambiguous.353 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the parol
evidence rule only prohibited the enforcement of prior inconsistent agreements and that extrinsic
evidence could be considered even when the language of the contract was not ambiguous.354 The
court further reasoned that allowing for extrinsic evidence would allow the courts to better
interpret the contract and, thus, better meet the reasonable expectations of the parties at the time
the contract was formed.355 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that
extrinsic evidence is admissible for interpreting the meaning of the words of a contract even
when the language is not ambiguous.356
North Pacific Directors, Inc. v. Dep’t of Administration
In North Pacific Directors, Inc. v. Dep’t of Administration,357 the supreme court held that a
contractor is not entitled to additional compensation due to differing site conditions when the
differing site conditions could have been noticed during contractor inspections.358 The Alaska
Department of Administration (“Department”) and North Pacific contracted for a renovation,
including asbestos removal, of the Juneau State Office Building.359 North Pacific’s contract
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acknowledged that they were responsible for visiting and carefully examining the site.360
Nevertheless, North Pacific did not visit the site before they began the contract’s work.361 Later,
it requested additional compensation for the asbestos removal, claiming the site’s conditions
differed from what was outlined in the contract, which caused the company to incur additional
costs in fulfilling its obligations.362 The Department denied the differing site conditions claim.363
North Pacific subsequently filed a claim against the Department, asserting that the Department
had a duty to disclose superior knowledge of the site’s conditions.364 The supreme court affirmed
the lower court’s decision, stating that no such duty existed.365 Therefore, according to the court,
North Pacific’s claim must fail due to their failure to investigate the site.366 Affirming the lower
court’s decision, the supreme court held that a contractor is not entitled to additional
compensation due to differing site conditions when the differing site conditions could have been
noticed during contractor inspections.367
Weilbacher v. Ring
In Weilbacher v. Ring,368 the supreme court held that contracts to transfer privilege are not
unenforceable simply because a third party must approve the transfer before the transferee can
enjoy the privilege’s benefits.369 Weilbacher brought action against Ring, a purchaser of one of
his lots, seeking rescission of the sale based on a mutual mistake concerning which boat-tie ups
were associated with each of his lots.370 As the right to some of the tie-ups in question had been
subsequently re-sold to Berube, a third party whom Weilbacher had failed to join as a defendant,
the court ordered Weilbacher to join Berube as an indispensable party.371 Weilbacher declined.372
Asserting that Berube was necessary to provide relief to the parties, the lower court dismissed
Weilbacher’s claim.373 On appeal, Weilbacher argued that because the failure to gain approval by
the homeowner’s association had rendered the sales contract between him and Ring meaningless,
Berube was not an indispensable party because Weilbacher had no claim against him.374 The
supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that many types of privilege are
subject to approval by third parties prior to sale.375 Nevertheless, according to the court, the
initial sales contract here memorializing the privilege transfers were no less enforceable just
because public agency approval was required before the parties could receive the full benefits of
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their contractual obligations.376 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that
contracts to transfer privilege are not unenforceable simply because a third party must approve
the transfer.377
CRIMINAL LAW
Top
Bottcher v. State
In Bottcher v. State,378 the supreme court held a person does not need to be a chronic offender for
a lifetime revocation of their driver’s license to be proper.379 While intoxicated, Bottcher drove
his vehicle off of the road, killing a thirteen year-old boy and just nearly missing his nine yearold brother.380 Bottcher was stopped by a witness to the accident but refused to return to the
scene, deciding to drive in the opposite direction instead.381 Following his subsequent arrest, it
was determined that Bottcher had a blood-alcohol content of 0.237 at the time.382 Among other
punishments, the lower court ultimately revoked Bottcher’s driver’s license for life.383 On
appeal, Bottcher argued that this lifetime revocation was excessive.384 The supreme court
affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that it was the court’s duty to determine whether
the case at hand represented an extreme one where lifetime revocation was necessary to protect
the public.385 Here, according to the court, the lower court was not clearly mistaken in
determining that Bottcher’s driver’s license must be revoked for life to protect the public
considering his current offense in conjunction with his long history of alcohol abuse.386
Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held a person does not need to be a
chronic offender for a lifetime revocation of their driver’s license to be proper.387
Diorec v. State
In Diorec v. State,388 the court of appeals held that a probation condition must give
constitutionally adequate notice of what is prohibited.389 Diorec was charged with and plead no
contest to unlawful sexual exploitation of a minor for possessing tapes of his stepdaughter in
various stages of undress.390 The lower court imposed several probation conditions on Diorec,
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including a prohibition on possessing sexually explicit material.391 On appeal, Diorec argued that
prohibiting sexually explicit material possession was overbroad and unconstitutionally vague
because it might restrict possession of sexually explicit adult material.392 The court of appeals
remanded the lower court’s decision, reasoning that Diorec’s probation condition failed to give
Diorec adequate notice of what was actually prohibited.393 Thus, according to the court, since
“sexually explicit material” was defined to include “pornography,” a term that had been held to
be unconstitutionally vague, the probation condition was unconstitutionally vague as well.394
Remanding the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that a probation condition must
give constitutionally adequate notice of what is prohibited.395
Flood v. State
In Flood v. State,396 the court of appeals held that a defendant does not have a constitutional right
to waive his presence at trial.397 At trial, the judge denied Flood’s request to be absent at his
trial.398 On appeal, Flood argued the trial judge abused his discretion in denying this request.399
Flood reasoned that because a defendant has a constitutional right to be present at his trial, he
must also have a right to waive this constitutional right.400 The court of appeals affirmed the
lower court’s decision, reasoning that a constitutional right is a positive grant insofar as it does
not inherently provide a defendant with the opposite of that right.401 Thus, having the right to be
present at trial did not give Flood a constitutional right to waive his presence at trial.402
Affirming the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that there was no abuse of
discretion since a defendant does not have a constitutional right to waive his presence at trial.403
George v. State
In George v. State,404 the court of appeals held that probationers are not awarded good time
credit to for spending time at a halfway house under a condition of probation.405 George and
Price were sentenced to various periods of probation as part of their convictions.406 On probation,
both George and Price spent time at Glacier Manor, a halfway house.407 Subsequently, both
violated their probations multiple times, had their probations revoked by the lower court and
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were ordered to serve the remainder of their sentences in jail.408 On appeal, George and Price
argued that they should receive good time credit for their time spent at Glacier Manor.409 The
court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the governing statute, by its
very terms, only applied to prisoners spending time at a correctional facility.410 In addition, the
court found that, as a matter of policy, that prisoners and probationers have different incentives
for good behavior and that the application of good time credit is the prisoner’s, not probationer’s,
incentive for good behavior.411 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held
that probationers are not awarded good time credit to for spending time at a halfway house under
a condition of probation.412
Jarnig v. State
In Jarnig v. State,413 the court of appeals held that a warrantless search of a closed container is
invalid unless the container is both “immediately associated with the arrest and within the
person’s immediate control at the time of arrest.”414 In, 2006 the Anchorage police arrested
Jarnig, the driver of a car they believed to have been stolen.415 While Jarnig was in a patrol car
following his arrest, an officer searched the alleged stolen car and found a black nylon bag
wedged under the passenger’s seat that contained drugs and drug paraphernalia.416 Subsequently,
Jarnig was charged with third-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance.417 The lower
court convicted Jarnig, holding that the police had the authority to search any container that was
within the driver’s reach at the time of the arrest.418 On appeal, Jarnig argued that the search of
the bag was illegal.419 The court of appeals remanded the case back to the lower court, reasoning
that the search was invalid because a warrantless search of a closed container will only be upheld
as a search incident to arrest if the container was both within the person's immediate control at
the time of arrest and immediately associated with that person.420 Thus, the lower court’s
analysis was incomplete.421 Remanding the case back to the lower court, the court of appeals
held that a warrantless search of a closed container is invalid unless the container is both
“immediately associated with the arrest and within the person’s immediate control at the time of
arrest.”422
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Joseph v. State
In Joseph v. State,423 the court of appeals held that mitigating factor (d)(9) under the state’s
presumptive sentencing regime is applicable to sentencing for perjury.424 Following a trial for a
speeding ticket, the defendant was charged with perjury.425 A presumptive sentencing range
applied to the defendant because she was a second felony offender.426 At trial, the defendant
proposed mitigating factor (d)(9) among others.427 Mitigating factor (d)(9) requires sentencing
mitigation where the conduct in question is among the least serious within the defined offense.428
The lower court reasoned that (d)(9) was inapplicable to sentencing for perjury because its
classification as a class B felony indicated the legislature’s decision that perjury was a serious
offense.429 On appeal, the defendant argued that the ruling on (d)(9) was made in error.430 The
court of appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning while the designation as a class B
felony was evidence of the legislature’s decision that perjury was a serious offense, accepting the
lower court’ reasoning would result in every class B felony falling outside the scope of (d)(9).431
However, according to the court, factor (d)(9)’s function remained consistent across all offenses,
serious or not.432 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that mitigating
factor (d)(9) under the state’s presumptive sentencing regime is applicable to sentencing for
perjury.433
Knipe v. State
In Knipe v. State,434 the court of appeals held that, when the totality of the circumstances is
properly weighed, it is not inappropriate to not refer sentencing to a statewide three-judge
panel.435 Knipe pled guilty to sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree but requested that the
issue of sentencing be referred to a statewide three-judge panel because he believed the
presumptive sentence would be manifestly unjust as applied to him.436 The lower court denied
this request.437 On appeal, Knipe argued that denial of his request for referral to the statewide
three-judge panel was manifestly unjust because of his low cognitive abilities and his childhood
history of sexual abuse and neglect.438 The court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision,
reasoning that the superior court appropriately focused their denial of Knipe’s request on the
totality of the circumstances, including the severity of the injury to the victim and Knipe’s failure
423
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to provide an assessment of his rehabilitation potential or recidivism risk.439 The court further
reasoned that although Knipe’s cognitive ability and history of abuse presented legitimate
factors, the lower court’s decision not to refer sentencing to the statewide three-judge panel was
not clearly mistaken.440 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that,
when the totality of the circumstances is properly weighed, it is not inappropriate to not refer
sentencing to a statewide three-judge panel.441
Lewis v. State
In Lewis v. State,442 the court of appeals held that walking away from a halfway house in a nonviolent and temporary manner could constitute a mitigating factor for the offense of escape in the
second degree.443 In 2010, Lewis was placed in Glenwood Center, a halfway house in
Anchorage.444 Shortly after his arrival, Lewis, drunk at the time, wandered away from the house
despite being told that he should not leave.445 Within twenty-four hours, Lewis called the police
and turned himself in, claiming that his leaving was a big misunderstanding.446 Nevertheless, at
his sentencing, the lower court refused to mitigate his sentence even though his escape was both
temporary and nonviolent.447 On appeal, Lewis argued that the lower court erred in refusing to
mitigate his sentence.448 The court of appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, finding the
nature of his escape both nonviolent and temporary enough to warrant a mitigation of his
sentence.449 The court reasoned that such mitigation was proper because Lewis’ escape “was
among the least serious included in the offense” for which he was convicted.450 Reversing the
lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that walking away from a halfway house in a
non-violent and temporary manner could constitute a mitigating factor for the offense of escape
in the second degree.451
Luckart v. State
In Luckart v. State,452 the supreme court held that when a defendant’s sentencing is referred to a
three judge panel because it has been determined that the presumptive sentence would be
manifestly unjust, the panel has authority to expand the prisoner’s parole eligibility.453 After
determining that sentencing Luckart within the presumptive range would be manifestly unjust,

439

Id.
Id.
441
Id. at 363.
442
312 P.3d 856 (Alaska Ct. App. 2013).
443
Id. at 859–60.
444
Id. at 857.
445
Id. at 858.
446
Id.
447
Id. at 859.
448
Id.
449
Id. at 859–60.
450
Id. at 860.
451
Id. at 859–60.
452
314 P.3d 1226 (Alaska 2013).
453
Id. at 1238.
440

the lower court referred Luckart’s case to a three-judge panel for sentencing.454 Although it
sentenced him below the presumptive range, the panel determined it did not have authority to
enhance Luckart’s parole eligibility.455 On appeal, Luckart argued that the panel did have such
authority.456 The supreme court reversed the panel’s decision, reasoning that a sentence’s
presumptive nature alone was not determinative of the panel’s authority to enhance parole
eligibility.457 The court further stated that when the panel is referred a case governed by
presumptive sentencing guidelines, the panel has the authority to enhance parole eligibility
unless limited by a specific statutory provision.458 Reversing the panel’s decision, the supreme
court held that the three judge sentencing panel has authority to grant enhanced parole eligibility
to defendants subject to presumptive sentences.459
Martin v. State
In Martin v. State,460 the court of appeals held that police may obtain evidence upon which to
base a search warrant by walking up to a residence and peering inside through a small break in a
closed set of blinds.461 After tailing a group of individuals who had just purchased some
materials often used in the production of methamphetamine, a police officer approached the
apartment the group had just entered by way of a shared deck.462 Upon reaching the window, the
officer observed a small crack in the closed blinds and looked into the residence where he saw
items used for making methamphetamine.463 The officer obtained a search warrant by telephone
and then proceeded to arrest Martin and search the apartment.464 On appeal, Martin argued that
the officer’s search was unconstitutionally unreasonable.465 The court of appeals affirmed the
lower court’s decision, reasoning that although the closed blinds likely indicated both a desire for
as well as a reasonable subjective belief of privacy, the weight of authority permitted the
government to peer through such a hole.466 Thus, because the officer was able to peer through the
hole with physical ease from a public vantage point, and was not conducting a mere fishing
expedition, his search was lawful and not unreasonable.467 Affirming the lower court’s decision,
the court of appeals held that police may obtain evidence upon which to base a search warrant by
walking up to a residence and peering inside through a small break in a closed set of blinds.468
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Rofkar v. State
In Rofkar v. State,469 the court of appeals held that a charge for possessing or manufacturing
marijuana should be merged with a conviction for maintaining a building for keeping their
controlled substances under Alaska’s Double Jeopardy Clause.470 In the lower court, Rofkar was
convicted of three counts relating to the possession and manufacturing of marijuana and a fourth
count relating to the maintenance of a building for keeping or distributing controlled substances.
471
The lower court merged the first three charges into a single conviction but refused to merge
the fourth charge with the other three.472 On appeal, Rofkar argued that Alaska’s Double
Jeopardy Clause requires the fourth charge be merged with the other three.473 The court of
appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the statute criminalizing the
maintaining of a building for keeping controlled substances was aimed at persons who facilitate
someone else’s drug offenses rather than at the person committing the drug offenses.474 Thus, if a
person both commits the underlying drug offenses in addition to maintaining a building for
keeping their controlled substances, the charges must be merged.475 Reversing the lower court’s
decision, the court of appeals held that a charge for possessing or manufacturing marijuana must
be merged with a conviction for maintaining a building for keeping their controlled substances
under Alaska’s Double Jeopardy Clause.476
State v. Korkow
In State v. Korkow,477 the supreme court held that there is no legal presumption against a parole
restriction beyond the statutory minimum.478 Korkow was convicted of first-degree murder after
stabbing his wife to death in front of his two young children.479 The sentencing judge, after
considering the severity of the case and Korkow’s lack of remorse, restricted Korkow’s
eligibility for discretionary parole beyond the 33-year statutory minimum to 50 years, noting the
need to protect Korkow’s children and the public at large.480 On appeal, Korkow argued that
parole restriction was outside of the permissible range compared with other cases.481 The
supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that although sentencing courts
may take into consideration the Parole Board’s expertise in assessing an individual’s likelihood
for a successful parole, sentencing courts are expressly permitted to restrict eligibility for
discretionary parole beyond the minimum.482 Here, the restriction was proper because the lower
court had adequately considered all enumerated criteria, including the severity of the crime,
469
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Korkow’s lack of remorse and the need to protect the public.483 Affirming the lower court’s
decision, the supreme court held that there is no legal presumption against a parole restriction
beyond the statutory minimum.484
State v. Silvera
In State v. Silvera,485 the court of appeals held that federal law does not preempt a three-judge
sentencing panel’s authority to impose a sentence lower than the presumptive range after
considering the “harsh collateral consequences” of deportation.486 After reviewing Silvera’s case,
a three-judge sentencing panel considered the non-statutory mitigating factor of deportation’s
“harsh collateral consequences” on a criminal defendant and imposed a sentence under the
presumptive range since deportation would subject Silvera to those “harsh collateral
consequences.”487 On appeal, the State argued that federal law prohibited a panel from
modifying Silvera’s sentence to affect immigration consequences.488 The court of appeals
affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that Congress only prohibited state courts from
deciding whether a criminal defendant should be deported.489 Congress, according to the court,
did not expressly forbid state courts from adjusting a defendant’s sentence to lessen the risk of
deportation.490 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that federal law
does not preempt a three-judge sentencing panel’s authority to consider the “harsh collateral
consequences” of deportation and impose a sentence lower than the presumptive range.491
Stepovich v. State
In Stepovich v. State,492 the supreme court held that merely attempting to hide evidence is not
sufficient to support a conviction for attempted evidence tampering.493 Stepovich and another
man were standing in an alley behind a bar with their hands cupped leaning towards each
other.494 Both men were looking down into their hands when the arresting officer spotted
them.495 As the officer approached the men, Stepovich backed away behind a dumpster.496 He
reappeared empty handed.497 Subsequently, the officer found a small envelope of cocaine lying
behind the dumpster.498 Stepovich was accordingly found guilty of attempted evidence
tampering.499 On appeal, Stepovich argued that his conduct was not sufficient to support a
483
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conviction for attempted evidence tampering.500 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s
decision, reasoning that if a broad reading of suppressing and concealing were accepted it would
unduly raise many misdemeanor cases when evidence was dropped or thrown into felony
evidence tampering convictions.501 Therefore, according to the court, the test here was whether
the defendant’s actions made it impossible or substantially more difficult for the evidence to be
recovered.502 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that merely
attempting to hide evidence is not sufficient to support a conviction attempted evidence
tampering.503
Welsh v. State
In Welsh v. State,504 the court of appeals held that restitution in criminal cases is limited to the
amount of actual damages that result rather than the amount of the defendant’s unjust gain.505
Welsh was convicted of third-degree theft after stealing medication from the clinic where she
was employed.506 The pills she stole were purchased by the clinic for three cents each and sold
retail for seventy-six cents each.507 The lower court required Welsh to pay the seventy-six cents
price in restitution based on an unjust enrichment theory.508 On appeal, Welsh argued that it was
improper to award damages on such a theory in the case.509 The court of appeals reversed the
lower court’s decision, reasoning that the proper measure of restitution is the amount of actual
damages suffered.510 The court further reasoned, however, this amount does not need to be
limited to wholesale prices, as that amount might not be sufficient to wholly cover the actual
damages suffered.511 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that
restitution in criminal cases is limited to the actual amount of damages suffered.512
Williams v. State
In Williams v. State,513 the court of appeals held that parole, even if subject to restrictive
conditions, is not “official detention.”514 Williams, having been convicted of a felony, was
ordered to live at a community residential center (“CRC”) as a condition of his parole.515 While
being transported from one CRC to another, Williams left the transporting van as well as the
surrounding area.516 Based on these actions, Williams was convicted of escape in the second
500
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degree, which was defined as removing oneself from official detention resulting from a felony
without lawful authority.517 On appeal, the State argued that “official detention” included parole
with restrictive conditions such as the ones here.518 The court of appeals reversed the lower
court’s decision, reasoning that the legislative history of the statutory defined “official detention”
such that the legislature did not intend the term to include supervision on probation or parole.519
Accordingly, Williams could not be convicted of escape in the second degree because he was not
subject to official detention.520 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held
that parole, even if subject to restrictive conditions, is not “official detention.”521
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Top
Angasan v. State
In Angasan v. State,522 the supreme court held that a defendant seeking a new trial based on
evidence not presented at trial must normally show that this evidence was not known and could
not have been known through diligent inquiry at the time of trial.523 Angasan filed a motion
seeking a new trial, claiming that he had new evidence that would exculpate him from his
conviction.524 The evidence consisted of affidavits from four of his relatives.525 The lower court
denied Angasan’s motion, finding that the affidavits were known to either Angasan or his
attorney at the time of trial and thus did not qualify as newly discovered evidence.526 On appeal,
Angasan argued that he was entitled to a new trial based on any such evidence not presented at
trial, even if it was known to the defendant or could have been known with diligent inquiry.527
The supreme affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that almost every American
jurisdiction required the new evidence to be unknown and not knowable through diligent inquiry
at the time of trial before granting a new trial.528 The court further reasoned that such a
requirement was necessary to prevent defendants from obtaining a new trial after receiving an
adverse result and realizing that a different strategy might have been more effective.529 Affirming
the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that a defendant seeking a new trial based on
evidence not presented at trial must normally show that this evidence was not known and could
not have been known through diligent inquiry at the time of trial.530
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Fisher v. State
In Fisher v. State,531 the supreme court held that when a defendant files a habeas petition that
could be filed under Criminal Rule 35.1, the court must treat the complaint as an application for
post-conviction relief under that rule.532 Fisher filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, raising
issues that could have been pursued in an application for post-conviction relief under Criminal
Rule 35.1.533 The lower court dismissed his petition, and later denied his motion for
reconsideration, holding that courts have the discretion to dismiss such claims and direct the
defendant to file a new application for post-conviction relief.534 On appeal, Fisher argued that
Civil Rule 86(m) requires the superior court to convert his petition into an application for postconviction relief.535 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that courts
have never been given the discretion to dismiss habeas complaints that could be treated as
applications for post-conviction relief.536 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court
held that when a defendant files a habeas petition that could be filed under Criminal Rule 35.1,
the court must treat the complaint as an application for post-conviction relief under that rule.537
Davison v. State
In Davison v. State,538 the court of appeals held that when a defendant disputes factual
allegations in a presentence report, the sentencing court must determine the validity and
relevance of those allegations.539 Davison was initially charged with sexually assaulting his
daughter based on penile, oral and digital penetration.540 On appeal, Davidson argued that
statements regarding the alleged oral and digital penetration, charges he was acquitted of, should
be stricken from the presentence report.541 The court of appeals reversed the lower court’s
decision, reasoning that the importance of presentence reports and the degree to which they can
affect a defendant in future necessitated action to determine whether any disputed facts contained
in the report are sufficiently verified.542 Thus, if such facts are found to be untrue, lacking in
verification or will not be considered, the court must remove those assertions from the report.543
Reversing the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that when a defendant disputes
factual allegations in a presentence report, the sentencing court must determine the validity and
relevance of those allegations.544
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Hertz v. Macomber
In Hertz v. Macomber,545 the supreme court held that the Department of Corrections (“DOC”)
may impose furlough release conditions regardless of whether those conditions were part of an
inmate’s original sentence.546 In 1984, Hertz was convicted of second-degree murder and
sentenced to a 40-year term with a 20-year parol eligibility.547 In 2009, he applied for an early
release furlough but was denied because he refused to sign the paper work that required
treatment or community service as conditions to his furlough.548 Hertz subsequently filed a
complaint against his parol officers arguing that they lacked authority to impose furlough release
conditions because they were not part of his original sentence and, accordingly, violated his due
process rights.549 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that such
conditions did not prolong Hertz’s sentence.550 Thus, according to the court, the conditions did
not implicate a liberty interest and, consequently, did not violate Hertz’s due process rights.551
Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the DOC may impose furlough
release conditions regardless of whether those conditions were part of an inmate’s original
sentence.552
Hunter v. State
In Hunter v. State,553 the court of appeals held that a detective cannot testify to a defendant’s
reputation based solely on interviews with and reports by other law enforcement officers.554
Hunter was convicted for second-degree murder based in part on the testimony of Detective
Perrenoud.555 Perrenoud testified that Hunter had a reputation in the community for aggression
and violence.556 This testimony was based entirely on an investigation involving interviews with
law enforcement officers and reviews of documents prepared by law enforcement officers.557 On
appeal, the State argued that the law enforcement officers were members of the community and
therefore that Hunter’s reputation amongst them was his reputation within the community.558 The
court of appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that Hunter’s testified-to
reputation existed only in a particular group of the community and, accordingly, was not
necessarily generally held.559 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that
a detective cannot testify to a defendant’s reputation based solely on interviews with and reports
by other law enforcement officers.560
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Hutton v. State
In Hutton v. State,561 the court of appeals held that a defendant’s right to a unanimous jury with
regards to a special interrogatory is protected when the jury receives a general instruction that
each verdict must be unanimous.562 Hutton was charged with third-degree misconduct involving
weapons, which required the jury find that he knowingly possessed a concealable firearm.563 To
avoid prejudice with regards to the other charges against Hutton, this question was presented to
the jury as a special interrogatory.564 Because the interrogatory did not contain the phrase “We,
the jury,” as the other counts began, Hutton argued on appeal that there was a significant
possibility that the jury did not understand its decision needed to be unanimous.565 The court of
appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that, because the special interrogatory was
presented along with jury instructions stating that each verdict must be unanimous, the jury
probably viewed the unanimity requirement as applying to the special interrogatory.566 Affirming
the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that a defendant’s right to a unanimous jury
with regards to a special interrogatory is protected when the jury receives a general instruction
that each verdict must be unanimous.567
Miller v. State
In Miller v. State,568 the court of appeals held that failing to make an express ruling in connection
with sentencing is not harmless error where the record does not clearly establish the truth of the
allegation at issue.569 Miller was charged with assault for attacking a woman with whom he had a
previous sexual encounter.570 At trial, the State alleged that the assault charge was a crime of
domestic violence, which carried a mandatory sentence of thirty days in prison.571 Without ever
expressly ruling whether Miller’s crime was a domestic violence, the lower court issued its
written judgment labeling it as such.572 On appeal, the State argued that the court’s error was
harmless.573 The court of appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, stating that the court was
required to make a factual and legal determination supporting its characterization of the offense
on the record.574 Here, the record did not affirmatively establish that Miller’s conduct constituted
a crime of domestic violence.575 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held
that failing to make an express ruling in connection with sentencing is not harmless error where
the record does not clearly establish the truth of the allegation at issue.576
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State v. Clifton
In State v. Clifton,577 the court of appeals held that a convicted criminal defendant could be
subject to a second and separate trial to assess if the defendant was guilty but mentally ill.578
Clifton believed she was under covert government surveillance.579 In 2006, Clifton and her
human resources manager had a meeting where Clifton was informed she would have to undergo
psychiatric evaluation.580 In response to this news, Clifton shoved the barrel of a loaded pistol
against the manager’s ribs and pulled the trigger.581 While the pistol failed to fire, Clifton was
still indicted for attempted murder and third-degree assault.582 Multiple psychologists determined
that Clifton suffered from a delusional disorder, but Clifton’s attorney stated that he did not
intend to rely on an insanity defense.583 Clifton was later found guilty on both counts and the
State filed a motion asking the lower court to determine if Clifton should be found “guilty but
mentally ill.”584 The lower court stated that ruling her as “guilty but mentally ill” after her trial
would be an unconstitutional violation of her equal protection rights.585 On appeal, Clifton
argued that the legislature’s distinction between defendants who commit crimes and defendants
who commit crimes who also suffer from a mental disease was arbitrary.586 The court of appeals
reversed the lower court’s decision, stating that it was constitutional for the state to have lawfully
enacted the procedures.587 The court reasoned that the legislature, in drawing the aforementioned
distinction, could have found that the latter types of defendants should have their parole
restricted because of their inability to appreciate the crimes they committed.588 Reversing the
lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that a convicted criminal defendant could be
subject to a second and separate trial to assess if the defendant was guilty but mentally ill.589
White v. State
In White v. State,590 the court of appeals held that a trial court may only grant a motion to
overturn the jury’s verdict and order a new trial when the judge finds the evidence to be so onesided that the jury’s view of the case was plainly unreasonable and unjust.591 In the trial court, a
jury found White guilty of fourth-degree assault.592 After the verdict, White motioned under
Alaska Criminal Rule 33(a) for the judge to overturn the jury’s verdict and order a new trial on
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the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.593 The judge denied the
motion because the jury’s verdict should not be overturned if there was any evidentiary basis for
the jury’s decision.594 On appeal, White argued that the district court erred by using the “any
evidentiary basis” test when deciding his motion for a new trial.595 The court of appeals reversed
the trial court’s decision, reasoning that the only legal test appropriate in a trial court for a
motion for a new trial is the “plainly unreasonable and unjust” test.596 The court further reasoned
that the “any evidentiary basis” test is the proper standard only when an appellate court reviews a
trial court’s denial of a request for a new trial.597 Reversing the trial court’s decision, the court of
appeals held that a trial court may only grant a motion to overturn the jury’s verdict and order a
new trial when the judge finds the evidence to be so one-sided that the jury’s view of the case
was plainly unreasonable and unjust.598
EMPLOYMENT LAW
Top
ARCTEC Services v. Cummings
In ARCTEC Services v. Cummings,599 the supreme court held that witness-credibility
determinations by the Workers’ Compensation Board (the “Board”) are made in accordance with
a subjective standard.600 In 2006, Cummings was hurt on the job and began receiving workers'
compensation checks that periodically required her to certify that she had not been working.601
However, while receiving the checks, Cummings occasionally worked without pay in her
boyfriend's store.602 In 2008, ARCTEC filed a petition for a finding of fraud with the Board.603
Since the Board found Cummings’ testimony that she considered her time at the store to be
purely voluntary and therefore not necessary to report credible, it denied ARCTEC’s petition.604
ARCTEC subsequently appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission (the
“Commission”), arguing that the Board should have used an objective standard to evaluate
Cummings' testimony that would determine if Cummings’ subjectively held belief was
objectively reasonable.605 The Commission agreed that the Board should have used an objective
standard.606 The supreme court reversed the Commission’s decision, citing evidence that both the
legislative history and the language of the statute itself called for a subjective standard.607 The
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court further reasoned that since the legislature had given the Board "the sole power to determine
credibility of a witness," the objective standard would also impermissibly impinge on the Board's
authority.608 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that witness-credibility
determinations by the Board are made in accordance with a subjective standard.609
Beach v. Handforth-Kome
In Beach v. Handforth-Kome,610 the supreme court held once an employer discovers reasonable
grounds for dismissal, the employer need not provide additional procedural protections.611 Beach
was fired from her job at a health clinic when the clinic’s director discovered that she had
falsified prescription drug records.612 Beach sued, alleging a breach of the implied covenant of
good faith since she believed her employer retaliated against her for her suggestions about
improving clinic security.613 On appeal, Beach argued that her termination was not objectively
fair.614 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that Handforth-Kome
had conducted a methodical review of the records that showed that the records were falsified and
that Beach was responsible for the aforementioned falsification.615 Accordingly, since the
methodical review uncovered reasonable grounds for dismissal, according to the court, additional
procedural protection was unnecessary.616 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme
court held once an employer discovers reasonable grounds for dismissal, the employer need not
provide additional procedural protections.617 Beach was fired from her job at a health clinic when
the clinic’s director discovered that she had falsified prescription drug records.618
Grimmett v. University of Alaska
In Grimmett v. University of Alaska,619 the supreme court held that an employer generally may
not avoid a for-cause employee’s due process protections at termination through use of a
nonretention clause.620 In 2008, two employees of the University of Alaska lost their
employment due to performance concerns.621 Despite the for-cause language in their
employment contracts, both employees were denied termination-for-cause hearings based upon
the nonretention clause in their contracts.622 On appeal, the University of Alaska argued that the
nonretention clause allowed the University to terminate non-tenured employees without a
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showing of cause.623 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that using
nonretention as a pretext for performance related termination violates an employee’s expectation
of due process under a for-cause contract.624 The court further reasoned that under the
University’s regulations, nonretention was only available when market forces, lack of funds,
reorganization or other nonperformance issues called for the discontinuation of employment.625
Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that an employer generally may not
avoid a for-cause employee’s due process protections by use of a nonretention clause in
terminating employment.626
Johnson v. Aleut Corp.
In Johnson v. Aleut Corp, 627 the supreme court held that a broadly worded arbitration agreement
can give an arbitrator authority to determine the arbitrability of disputes as well as resolve such
disputes based on theories that differ from those submitted by the parties.628 The employment
contract between the Aleut Corporation (the “Corporation”) and Johnson stated that Johnson
would serve as CEO of the Corporation with an automatic extension subject to both his fulfilling
a reminder provision and the Corporation providing him with notice if it chose not to renew his
employment.629 Even though the Corporation never received Johnson’s reminder, the two parties
nonetheless proceeded to engage in renewal discussions.630 After Johnson was subsequently
terminated without requisite notice, he challenged his termination in arbitration as required by
his employment agreement. 631 The arbitrator ultimately determined that because the Corporation
was aware of the reminder provision and because it did not terminate Johnson for cause, it
breached the contract.632 The lower court subsequently vacated the decision, holding that the
arbitrator acted beyond the scope of his authority in determining that, contrary to both parties’
concessions, the reminder was not a condition precedent to the renewal of Johnson’s contract.633
The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that great deference is given to
arbitration decisions.634 Thus, according to the court, the arbitrator’s conclusion that the
Corporation violated the agreement was reasonable and within the scope of the arbitrator’s
authority.635 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that a broadly worded
arbitration agreement can give an arbitrator authority to determine the arbitrability of disputes as
well as resolve such disputes based on theories that differ from those submitted by the parties.636
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Mills v. Hankla
In Mills v. Hankla,637 the supreme court held that municipalities are immune from negligent
hiring claims because hiring is a discretionary action requiring deliberation and judgment.638
Hankla did not meet the eligibility requirements when he was appointed Hoonah police chief by
the Hoonah City Council (the “Council”).639 The Council subsequently amended the city code to
make him qualified and rehired him.640 Four employees then claimed the city negligently hired
Hankla because of his alleged discriminatory treatment and sexual harassment.641 On appeal, the
employees challenged the lower court’s entry of summary judgment dismissing their negligent
hiring claim.642 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, interpreting Alaska
Statute 09.65.070(d)(2) as providing qualified official immunity protecting municipalities from
liability for discretionary actions when those actions were done by a public official within his
scope of duties.643 Here, according to the court, the Council’s appointment of Hankla was
discretionary because it required deliberation and judgment in evaluating and selecting
candidates from an applicant pool.644 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court
held that municipalities are immune from negligent hiring claims because hiring is a
discretionary action requiring deliberation and judgment.645
Morrison v. Nana Worleyparsons, LLC
In Morrison v. Nana Worleyparsons, LLC,646 the supreme court held that short-term performance
plans, without express indications to the contrary, do not alter at-will employment contracts.647
Morrison, an at-will employee at Nana Worleyparsons, was placed onto a Performance
Improvement Plan (“PIP”) aimed at improving his lackluster work performance and negative
attitude.648 Shortly thereafter, Morrison made an inappropriate comment to a co-worker at a work
party and was fired.649 On appeal, Morrison argued that Nana Worleyparsons both breached his
contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.650 The supreme court affirmed
the lower court’s decision, reasoning that since the PIP did not contain any express indications
changing the at-will nature of Morrison’s employment, the PIP did not alter his original at-will
employment contract.651 The court further reasoned Nana Worleyparson’s actions did not breach
the implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing because their actions were both objectively

637

297 P.3d 158 (Alaska 2013).
Id. at 173.
639
Id. at 161.
640
Id.
641
Id. at 162.
642
Id. at 173.
643
Id.
644
Id.
645
Id.
646
314 P.3d 508 (Alaska 2013).
647
Id. at 510–12.
648
Id. at 509.
649
Id. at 510.
650
Id.
651
Id. at 511–12.
638

and subjectively appropriate in Morrison’s particular circumstance.652 Affirming the lower
court’s decision, the supreme court held that short-term performance plans, without express
indications to the contrary, do not alter at-will employment contracts.653
Municipality of Anchorage v. Adamson
In Municipality of Anchorage v. Adamson,654 the supreme court held that in order to stay future
medical benefits, an employer must demonstrate “the existence of the probability” that an appeal
of a workers’ compensation decision will be decided against the compensation recipient.655 This
case consolidated two lower court cases.656 In one case, the Municipality of Anchorage appealed
an Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board (the “Board”) decision awarding compensation,
arguing that medical benefits should be stayed under the standard of “probability of success on
the merits.”657 The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission (the “Commission”)
subsequently refused the stay because the Municipality had not shown that it was more likely
than not that the appeal would prevail on the merits.658 In the other case, the City and Borough of
Juneau (“CBJ”) similarly appealed a Board decision, asking for a stay of future medical benefits
under the standard that it was more likely than not that the merits of the appeal would be decided
in CBJ’s favor.659 The Commission applied a substantial question standard and, finding that CBJ
raised a “serious and substantial question” about the claim, granted the stay.660 The supreme
court affirmed the “probability of success on the merits” standard, reasoning that the correct
standard must balance the hardships likely faced by both the employer and the employee in these
types of cases.661 Thus, according to the court, this high threshold was necessary since medical
benefits were ongoing benefits that acted as a salary substitute for injured employees.662
Reviewing the two consolidated cases, the supreme court held that in order to stay future medical
benefits, an employer must demonstrate “the existence of the probability” that an appeal of a
workers’ compensation decision will be decided against the compensation recipient.663
Plumbers & Pipefitters, Local 367 v. Municipality of Anchorage
In Plumbers & Pipefitters, Local 367 v. Municipality of Anchorage,664 the supreme court held
that the Anchorage Municipal Code (“AMC”) limits the equitable jurisdiction of courts with
respect to collective bargaining disputes.665 The Plumbers & Pipefitters, Local 367 (“Union”)
and the Municipality of Anchorage (“Anchorage”) were engaged in collective bargaining
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negotiations for over a year.666 Unable to reach an agreement on all key points, the Union and
Anchorage submitted Last Best Offers (“LBO”) to an arbitrator as required by the AMC.667 The
arbitrator adopted the Union’s LBO, but, subsequently, the Anchorage Assembly failed to
approve the decision.668 The Union voted to strike but in the interest of public health and safety
forewent executing that action for the time being.669 On appeal, the Union argued that the
arbitrator’s decision should be implemented in return for issuing an injunction against a strike
pursuant to the court’s equitable jurisdiction.670 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s
decision, reasoning that, even acting in equity, a court cannot disregard statutes that “plain and
fully” cover a situation.671 Thus, according to the court, the court’s equitable power to grant
relief that must be found within the AMC’s comprehensive scheme regulating impasses such as
here was absent.672 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the AMC
limits the equitable jurisdiction of courts with respect to collective bargaining disputes.673
Pruitt v. Providence Extended Care
In Pruitt v. Providence Extended Care,674 the supreme court held that filing an affidavit for
readiness for hearing nearly four years after an employer files a controversion of such claim does
not substantially comply with the two-year statute of limitations imposed by the workers’
compensation statute.675 In 2004, Pruitt was injured on the job and began receiving disability
benefits.676 In 2005, after Pruitt filed a workers’ compensation claim, Pruitt’s employer,
Providence Extended Care (“Providence”), filed three separate controversions in an attempt to
disclaim any future disability payments.677 In 2009, Pruitt filed an affidavit for readiness for
hearing and a hearing was held by the Workers’ Compensation Board (“Board”). Providence
argued, and the Board agreed, that Pruitt’s claim should be dismissed as she failed to file
anything within the two-year statute of limitations period, which began to run in 2005.678 The
Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission (“Commission”) subsequently upheld the
Board’s decision and Pruitt appealed to the supreme court.679 The supreme court affirmed the
Commission’s decision, reasoning that the plain language of the statute, along with the Board’s
urging in 2006 that Pruitt contact staff at the Board for assistance in filing the necessary
documents within the statute of limitations period, made it clear Pruitt did not substantially
comply with the statute.680 Affirming the Commission’s decision, the supreme court held that
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filing an affidavit for readiness for hearing nearly four years after an employer files a
controversion of such claim does not substantially comply with the two-year statute of
limitations imposed by the workers’ compensation statute.681
Rosales v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc.
In Rosales v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc.,682 the supreme court held that the Alaska Workers’
Compensation Board (“Board”) has authority to approve global settlements of related claims in
workers’ compensation cases.683 While working for Icicle Seafoods, Inc. (“Icicle”), Rosales was
injured.684 He filed a report with the Board as well as a maritime lawsuit but later settled all his
claims in a global settlement with Icicle, which the Board approved.685 When the Board
subsequently refused to amend the settlement on Rosales’ request, he appealed to the supreme
court arguing that the Board’s approval of the global settlement was invalid because it had no
jurisdiction over his maritime claim. 686 The supreme court affirmed the Board’s decision,
reasoning that even though Rosales could have pursued the two claims separately, the Board was
not prohibited from settling both claims.687 Thus, according to the court, not amending Rosales’
global settlement was proper to bar double recovery for the same claim.688 Affirming the Board’s
decision, the supreme court held that the Board has authority to approve global settlements of
related claims in workers’ compensation cases.689
FAMILY LAW
Top
Amy M. v. State
In Amy M. v. State,690 the supreme court held that, in deciding whether a parent has been given a
reasonable amount of time to remedy her conduct for purposes retaining parental rights, it is
appropriate to consider his or her history of substance abuse in conjunction with present
conduct.691 The Office of Children’s Services (“OCS”) filed a petition for termination of Amy’s
parental rights three months after her child, Kadin, tested positive for cocaine at birth.692 Amy
had, up to that point, repeatedly failed to complete inpatient treatment programs, despite the
requirements of her OCS case plan.693 However, between this filing and the start of the trial,
Amy began taking steps towards a sober future.694 Nevertheless, the lower court concluded that
Amy’s substance abuse placed Kadin in need of aid and that she failed to remedy the
681
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corresponding conditions within a reasonable time.695 On appeal, Amy argued that she was not
given a reasonable amount of time to remedy her substance abuse.696 The supreme court affirmed
the lower court’s decision, reasoning that to terminate parental rights, a parent must have failed
to remedy the conduct or conditions that placed the child in substantial risk within a reasonable
time.697 Here, according to the court, Amy did not take any concrete steps toward obtaining longterm residential treatment, as required by her case plan, and her positive steps towards recovery
were only very recent changes.698 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held
that, in deciding whether a parent has been given a reasonable amount of time to remedy her
conduct for purposes of maintaining child custody, it is appropriate to consider his or her present
conduct as well as his or her history of substance abuse.699
Casey K. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services.
In Casey K. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services,700 the supreme court held that a delay by
the Office of Children’s Services (“OCS”) in providing collateral information needed for a
person’s substance abuse evaluation does not in and of itself make OCS’s efforts to reunify that
person with their child unreasonable.701 In 2010, OCS began investigating Casey K., the mother
of a young girl named Cheyenne, for substance abuse and neglect.702 OCS established a case
plan for Casey, as well as a visitation schedule for Casey and Cheyenne, services for Casey
during her subsequent incarceration and funding for Casey’s urine analysis and other
assessments.703 Casey, however, took no action to remedy her conduct, avoided contact with
OCS, and failed to complete all but two of four urine analyses.704 In 2011, Casey had an
appointment for a substance abuse evaluation, but OCS failed to submit the required collateral
information to the assessor.705 Relying on incomplete information, the assessor concluded that
Casey did not require substance abuse treatment and the treatment Casey did in fact require was
delayed by approximately one year.706 On appeal, Casey argued that OCS’s efforts to reunite her
with Cheyenne were unreasonable because of the delay in providing the collateral information.707
The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that a brief lapse in OCS’s
provision of services did not prevent a finding that OCS made reasonable efforts toward
reunification.708 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that a delay by
OCS in providing collateral information needed for a person’s substance abuse evaluation does
not in and of itself make OCS’s efforts to reunify that person with their child unreasonable.709
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Childs v. Childs
In Childs v. Childs,710 the supreme court held that the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (the
“Act”) does not preclude the consideration of military service pay when modifying child support
payments.711 In 2005, Joshua and Christina Childs dissolved their marriage.712 Joshua
subsequently served in the United States Army.713 Accordingly, the lower court ordered the
modification of his child support obligation to account for his military Basic Allowance for
Housing.714 On appeal, Joshua argued that the Act precluded the lower court from ordering the
modification because he was an active service member.715 The supreme court affirmed the lower
court’s decision, reasoning that Joshua failed to show that his ability to present a defense was
materially affected by his military duty.716 The supreme court further reasoned that a
servicemember was not entitled to a stay against a civil action merely by virtue of serving.717
Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the Act does not preclude the
consideration of military service pay when modifying child support payments.718
Christopher C. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services
In Christopher C. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services,719 the supreme court held that
termination of parental rights is appropriate when active efforts to remedy the parents’
problematic behavior fail.720 The Office of Children’s Services (“OCS”) attempted to improve
both parents’ parenting skills, in addition to providing substance abuse counseling.721 However,
OCS eventually filed a petition to terminate the parents’ rights after efforts to improve their
parenting skills failed.722 The lower court granted the petition and terminated their parental rights
because they did not remedy their behavior despite OCS’s active efforts to avoid a family
breakup.723 On appeal, the parents challenged these findings without providing any evidence
beyond their own testimony.724 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning
that each challenged finding was supported by appropriate evidence.725 The court further
reasoned that while OCS’s efforts to keep the family together were imperfect, they qualified as
active efforts.726 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that termination of
parental rights is appropriate when active efforts to remedy parents’ problematic behavior fail.727
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Claudio P. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services
In Claudio P. v. State, Dep’t. of Health and Social Services,728 the supreme court held that
termination of parental rights is warranted when an incarcerated parent’s failure to adequately
arrange care for a child renders the child a need in care.729 Claudio P. was incarcerated prior to
the birth of his child.730 While incarcerated, he arranged for the mother to care for the child, but
the child was placed into the custody of the Office for Children’s Services (“OCS”) when the
mother’s parental rights were terminated.731 Ultimately, the lower court terminated Claudio’s
parental rights as well.732 On appeal, Claudio argued that the lower court erred in its ruling
because, even though he was incarcerated, he made reasonable plans for his child to be cared for
by his parents if the child’s mother was not available.733 The supreme court affirmed the lower
court’s decision, reasoning that because it took Claudio over a year to take action to arrange care
for his child following her placement in OCS custody, his efforts to plan for his child’s care were
inadequate.734 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that termination of
parental rights is warranted when an incarcerated parent’s failure to adequately arrange care for a
child renders the child a need in care.735
Co v. Matson
In Co v. Matson,736 the supreme court held that in child custody cases the statutory best-interest
factors should determine custody rather than deference to an interim custody agreement.737 As
part of a divorce proceeding between the husband, Co, and the wife, Matson, the two entered into
an interim custody arrangement regarding their two children.738 Matson later moved to amend
the interim agreement due to the inability of the parents to communicate adequately as well as
other concerns about Co’s parenting.739 In resolving the custody dispute, the lower court
determined that the children would benefit from sole legal custody residing in one parent and
concluded that the majority of the statutory best-interest factors favored granting Matson this
custody.740 On appeal, Co argued that the lower court had improperly weighed the evidence in
applying the statutory best-interest factors and abused its discretion by disrupting the status quo
of the interim custody agreement.741 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision,
reasoning that the court had substantial discretion in weighing the evidence and was not
obligated to maintain the status quo of the interim custody agreement.742 The court further
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reasoned that such pre-trial interim agreements come second to considerations of the best
interests of the children.743 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that in
child custody cases it is the statutory best-interest factors that determine custody rather than
deference to the status quo of an interim custody agreement.744
David S. v. Jared H. & Connie H.
In David S. v. Jared H. & Connie H.,745 the supreme court held that a biological parent’s
repeated incarceration does not justify failure to communicate meaningfully his or her child.746
David was not listed on his daughter’s birth certificate and had been incarcerated for most of her
life.747 After the biological mother died, the lower court granted the child’s maternal
grandparents’ petition to adopt her without David’s consent.748 On appeal, David argued this was
improper because his failure to communicate meaningfully with his daughter was justified by his
incarceration.749 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that
communication constraints resulting from the parent’s own conduct could never justify the
parent’s failure to communicate.750 Thus, according to the court, David’s repeated incarceration
from parole violations was a result of his own conduct and, consequently, made his failure
unjustifiable and his consent in the proceeding unnecessary.751 Affirming the lower court’s
decision, the supreme court held that a biological parent’s repeated incarceration dos not justify
failure to communicate meaningfully with his or her child.752
Glover v. Ranney
In Glover v. Ranney,753 the supreme court held that in divorce agreements dividing retirement
benefits from military pensions, courts can compel award of a survivor benefit allowing receipt
of the same amount after the employee spouse’s death.754 Former spouses, Glover and Ranney,
disputed whether a survivor benefit plan, from Glover’s military pension, should be divided
despite not being mentioned in the divorce agreement.755 On appeal, Glover argued the benefit
plan was outside of their agreement’s scope.756 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s
decision, reasoning that a settlement equitably dividing retirement benefits implicitly included
survivor benefits. 757 However, Ranney, who would receive 28.6% of Glover’s retired pay while
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he was alive, should not be awarded 55% of it after his death.758 Affirming the lower court’s
inclusion of survivor benefits but remanding for proper allocation, the supreme court held that in
divorce agreements dividing retirement benefits from military pensions, courts can compel award
of a survivor benefit allowing receipt of the same amount after the employee spouse’s death.759
Harris v. Governale
In Harris v. Governale,760 the supreme court held that a court must give weight to instances of
domestic violence that occur outside the presence of the child when analyzing the child’s best
interest during a custodial determination.761 Harris planned to move to Florida with her husband
and sued Governale for sole custody of their child.762 After a trial, however, the lower court
awarded primary physical custody to Governale.763 On appeal, Harris argued that it was error for
the lower court to disregard an instance of alleged domestic violence between Governale and his
current girlfriend only because it had taken place outside the presence of the child.764 The
supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that there was no requirement under
the statute that a child be present during alleged domestic violence for it to be a factor in a
custodial determination.765 Children, according to the court, do not need to see the domestic
violence for it to affect their wellbeing.766 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme
court held that a court must give weight to instances of domestic violence that occur outside the
presence of the child when analyzing the child’s best interest during a custodial
determinations.767
Hawkins v. Williams
In Hawkins v. Williams,768 the supreme court held that a grandparent seeking court-ordered
visitation with a grandchild must prove by clear and convincing evidence that visitation is in the
best interests of the child, even when the parents do not explicitly object to all types of
visitation.769 In 2011, Hawkins fell out of contact with her daughter, Williams.770 Hawkins later
filed a petition for grandparent visitation with Williams’ four children.771 At trial, Williams did
not testify, but Williams’ husband, who had no general objections to visitation, was concerned
with Hawkins seeing the children unannounced.772 On appeal, Hawkins argued that the lower
court should not have applied the clear and convincing standard to the case because the parents
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did not object to her visitation.773 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision,
reasoning that court-ordered visitation was different than other types of visitation because the
former infringed on the family’s rights to make decisions relating to the care of their children.774
The supreme court further reasoned that Williams and her husband did object to court-ordered
visitation by opposing Hawkins’ petition and voicing the aforementioned concern.775 Affirming
the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that a grandparent seeking court-ordered
visitation with a grandchild must prove by clear and convincing evidence that visitation is in the
best interests of the child.776
Irma E. v. State
In Irma E. v. State,777 the supreme court held that an adult family member is entitled to a hearing
to contest the Office of Children’s Services (“OCS”) placement decision if OCS denies him or
her child custody.778 Irma took custody of her biological granddaughters after their mother
became homeless.779 OCS then removed Irma’s granddaughters from her home because Irma
allowed her son to live with them despite his alleged history of sexual abuse.780 OCS placed
Irma’s granddaughters with a non-relative foster family and Irma repeatedly asked OCS to place
the girls back with her.781 OCS denied Irma’s request and refused to grant a hearing on the
matter.782 On appeal, Irma argued that OCS should have granted her a hearing.783 The supreme
court reversed the lower court’s decision, explaining that OCS was required by statute to not
only explain its basis for denying a child’s placement with an adult family member, but also to
inform the adult family member of his or her right to request a hearing to review OCS’s
decision.784 Accordingly, the court concluded that OCS’s denial of a hearing in this instance was
improper.785Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that an adult family
member is entitled to a hearing to contest the OCS placement decision if OCS denies him or her
child custody.786
Kyle S. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services
In Kyle S. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services,787 the supreme court held that efforts
directed at a child in need can satisfy the active efforts requirements of the Indian Child Welfare
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Act (“ICWA”).788 Jane, an Indian child, was taken into state custody after reports of physical
abuse.789 Based on Jane’s substance abuse problems and her propensity to run away, the lower
court determined that Jane was a child in need of aid.790 On appeal, Kyle S., Jane’s father, argued
that the Office of Children’s Services (“OCS”) failed to make the statutorily required “active
efforts” to prevent the family’s breakup.791 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s
decision, determining that OCS must address a family’s particular needs in determining what
efforts to take.792 The supreme court reasoned that because Jane’s behavior was the cause of her
adjudication as a child in need of aid, OCS could focus their efforts on Jane rather than on
reunification with her family.793 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held
that efforts directed at a child in need can satisfy the active efforts requirements of the ICWA.794
Mallory D. v. Malcolm D.
In Mallory D. v. Malcolm D.,795 the supreme court held that a court is not required to impute fulltime income to a parent who could work full-time but chooses not to in order to accommodate
their child’s scheduling needs.796 In 2009, Mallory and Malcolm divorced and split custody of
their three children.797 Mallory worked thirty hours per week at eighteen dollars per hour.798 She
testified that her schedule allowed her to drive her daughter to and from school but also that her
applications for full-time employment were unsuccessful.799 The lower court held that it was
required to impute full-time income to Mallory because she could work full-time but chose not to
in order to meet her daughter’s scheduling needs.800 On appeal, Mallory argued that the lower
court erred in doing so.801 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, explaining that
courts have broad discretion to impute income in cases of voluntary and unreasonable
underemployment.802 Thus, the lower court, according to the supreme court, was not required to
impute Mallory’s hypothetical full-time income because the statute “does not rigorously
command pursuit of maximum earnings.803 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme
court held that a court is not required to impute full-time income to a parent who could work fulltime but chooses not to in order to accommodate their child’s scheduling needs.804
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Martin v. Martin
In Martin v. Martin,805 the supreme court held that in a child custody case a lesser showing of
change in circumstances is needed to modify a visitation schedule than the underlying custody
provisions of a parenting agreement.806 Gregory and Melody Martin dissolved their marriage and
formed a parenting agreement with shared physical custody of their children.807 When the
Martins later filed cross-motions to modify the agreement, the lower court refused to modify the
custody provisions because there were no substantial changes in circumstances to warrant
modification.808 The lower court did, however, modify the visitation schedule, finding that these
modifications were in the children’s best interests.809 On appeal, Gregory argued that it was error
for the lower court to modify the visitation schedule while finding that there was no substantial
change in circumstances.810 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, noting that
the lower court’s finding of no substantial change in the circumstances.811 Nevertheless, the
lower court, as pointed out by the supreme court, did find that minimizing parental contact was
in the children’s best interest due to “ongoing conflicts.”812 Affirming the lower court’s decision,
the supreme court held that in a child custody case a lesser showing of change in circumstances
is needed to modify a visitation schedule than the underlying custody provisions of a parenting
agreement.813
Nancy M. v. John M.
In Nancy M. v. John M.,814 the supreme held that it is not error for a court to consider the impact
of a parent’s status as a renter and student on the stability factor during a custodial
determination.815 The father, John M., owned his own house and worked as a tenured professor
at the University of Alaska.816 The mother, Nancy M., had recently moved to California where
she rented an apartment and was in the process of seeking admission to a doctoral program.817
The lower court held that, in light of these facts, the stability factor in the custodial determination
slightly favored the father.818 Consequently, the lower court awarded primary custody of their
child to him.819 On appeal, Nancy argued that disfavoring a parent for renting and attending
graduate school was error.820 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning

805

303 P.3d 421 (Alaska 2013).
Id. at 425.
807
Id. at 423.
808
Id. at 423–25.
809
Id. at 424–25
810
Id. at 425.
811
Id.
812
Id.
813
Id.
814
308 P.3d 1130 (Alaska 2013).
815
Id. at 1135–36.
816
Id. at 1135.
817
Id. at 1131.
818
Id. at 1135.
819
Id. at 1133.
820
Id. at 1135.
806

that stability can take into account multiple factors.821 Thus, here, while the status of renter
versus homeowner was not dispositive, the stability factor was further influenced by the mother’s
general, undetermined plans for her future career and education.822 Affirming the lower court’s
decision, the supreme court held that it is not error for a court to consider the impact of a parent’s
status as a renter and student in regards to the stability of the household during a custodial
determination.823
Native Village of Tununak v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services
In Native Village of Tununak v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services,824 the supreme court
held that clear and convincing evidence is necessary before departing from the Indian Child
Welfare Act’s (“ICWA”) adoptive preferences.825 The Office of Children’s Services (“OCS”)
assumed custody of Dawn when she was four months old and placed her in a non-Native foster
home.826 The Native Village of Tununak (the “Tribe”) intervened in Dawn’s case, arguing for
placement with Dawn’s grandmother since adoptive preference must be given to the child’s
extended family unless there is “good cause” for deviation.827 The lower court held that a
preponderance of the evidence supported its conclusion that there was good cause to deviate
from the ICWA adoptive preferences, however.828 On appeal, the Tribe argued that the good
cause showing under the ICWA required clear and convincing evidence before departing from
the Act’s adoptive preferences.829 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision,
reasoning that Congress’ intent and the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the ICWA
favored overturning precedential use of the preponderance of the evidence standard in these
circumstances.830 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that clear and
convincing evidence is necessary before departing from the ICWA’s adoptive preferences.831
O’Neal v. Campbell
In O’Neal v. Campbell,832 the supreme court held that a parent with equal joint custody may still
be required to pay child support where there is a disparity in income between parents.833 O’Neal
and Campbell had a daughter together.834 Campbell made less than half of O’Neal’s income.835
In 2010, Campbell successfully petitioned the lower court for joint legal custody, shared physical
custody and a child support order.836 O’Neal motioned for reconsideration of the child support
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order since she had custody of their daughter fifty-percent of the time.837 The supreme court
affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that child support payments were based on both
the relative percentage of physical custody as well as the relative adjusted incomes of the
parents.838 Thus, according to the court, awarding child support to Campbell was not an abuse of
discretion under the circumstances.839 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court
held that a parent with equal joint custody may still be required to pay child support where there
is a disparity in income between the parents.840
Petrilla v. Petrilla
In Petrilla v. Petrilla,841 the supreme court held that decisions denying motions to modify child
support payments must be supported by a sufficient factual basis.842 Brian and Roxana Petrilla
divorced and subsequently shared custody of their daughter until late 2011 when Brian began
preparations to move to Nevada.843 Roxana sought to modify the child support payment, filing a
motion to impute Brian’s income from 2011 to calculate the support amount.844 After an earlier
determination that Brian’s imputable income was $44,387, Brian submitted a motion to modify
the payments based on his new position in Nevada, which paid $33,000 per year.845 The lower
court denied this motion reasoning that Brian had waited until an unfavorably high amount was
imputed to begin searching for work.846 On appeal, Brian argued that the lower court had abused
its discretion in denying his motion for modification despite his new salary information.847 The
supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the lower court was required to
make factual determinations before denying Brian’s motion.848 These determinations included
Brian’s earning capability and the availability of higher paying jobs in Nevada.849 Reversing the
lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that decisions denying motions to modify child
support payments must be supported by a sufficient factual basis.850
Philip J. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services
In Philip J. v. State Department of Health & Social Services,851 the supreme court held that
social workers’ failure to ensure an abusive father seeks aid does not render the workers’ efforts
to reunify an Indian father with his family inadequate.852 Philip had a long documented history of
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domestic abuse and sexual assault against his wife and children beginning in 2004.853 In April
2010, soon after Philip had been released from prison, an Office of Children Services (“OCS”)
family supervisor visited the family and identified safety threats including domestic violence,
sexual abuse and substance abuse.854 As a result, the family supervisor took custody of Philip’s
seven children, eventually placing them in their grandmother’s custody.855 Throughout 2010
OCS attempted to engage Philip in a case plan to reunify him with his children, to which he
refused to cooperate.856 The lower court eventually terminated Philip’s parental rights, ruling that
his children were in need of aid.857 On appeal, Philip argued that OCS’s efforts to reunite him
with his children were inadequate.858 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision,
reasoning that the prolonged and continued efforts of OCS to encourage Philip to attend anger
management, domestic violence and batter’s programs were sufficient.859 Affirming the lower
court’s decision, the supreme court held that social workers’ failure to ensure an abusive father
seeks aid does not render the workers’ reunification efforts inadequate.860
Pfeil v. Lock
In Pfeil v. Lock,861 the supreme court held that applying the Rose factors to the division of
marital property in divorce is inappropriate when assets have been commingled.862 In 2011, Lock
filed for divorce following four years of cohabitation and marriage.863 In dividing assets, the
parties could agree how they would allocate ownership of the two homes they owned but
disputed the distribution of a truck and a four-wheeler.864 On appeal, Lock argued for application
of the Rose factors to their real property, treating their divorce as a rescission and returning both
parties to the state they were in prior to marriage, but for application of different factors to the
truck and four-wheeler.865 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that
while limiting equitable division to a single asset may be appropriate, applying Rose rescission
principles to a single asset was not.866 Divorcing spouses, according to the court, have either
maintained separate economic identities or they have not, and where economic identities and
assets have been commingled, Rose rescission is not appropriate.867 Reversing the lower court’s
decision, the supreme court held that applying the Rose factors to the division of marital property
in divorce is inappropriate where assets have been commingled.868
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Reilly v. Northrop
In Reilly v. Northrop,869 the supreme court held that a parent could be voluntarily underemployed
when more lucrative employment could be found outside the parent’s trained field.870 In 2003,
Reilly and Vinnette had a child, while Reilly was working in Alaska as a drilling engineer.871 In
2004, Reilly moved to Montana but was unable to obtain comparable employment and
subsequently had a second child who, like his first child, had special needs.872 On appeal, Reilly
argued that his child support payments should based on his current income and, consequently,
should be reduced.873 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that
underemployment could be considered voluntary even if it was the result of failed good faith
attempts to gain sufficient employment.874 Thus, the lower court did not err in imputing Reilly’s
income based on the average income of workers in a similar field in southwest Montana.875
Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that a parent could be found to be
voluntarily underemployed when more lucrative employment could be found outside the parent’s
trained field.876
Ronny M. v. Nanette H.
In Ronny M. v. Nanette H.,877 the supreme court held that the fact that the non-custodial parent
earns a smaller income than the primary physical custodial parent does not constitute “good
cause” to vary child support payments.878 In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Ronny M. and
Nanette H. lived in Florida and had two children together.879 Eventually, the couple separated,
with Nanette maintaining custody.880 In 2009, Nanette moved to Alaska with the two children.881
In November 2010 Nanette filed in the lower court for sole legal and primary physical custody of
the children as well as to receive child support payments.882 In 2011, the lower court ordered
Ronny to pay Nanette $215 per month in child support.883 On appeal, Ronny argued that the
lower court should have found “good cause” to vary the child support payments because Nanette
had enough money to support the children without his payments that he could not afford.884 The
supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that even though Nannette made
more money than Ronny, the difference between their incomes did not amount to a showing of
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manifest injustice, which is required to find good cause.885 Affirming the lower court’s decision,
the supreme court held that the fact that the non-custodial parent earns a smaller income than the
primary physical custodial parent does not constitute “good cause” to vary child support
payments.886
Rosenblum v. Perales
In Rosenblum v. Perales,887 the supreme court held that a court is not barred from considering a
parent’s military deployment when resolving a custody dispute.888 Perales sued Rosenblum, the
father of her four-year-old son, for primary physical custody and shared legal custody.889 The
trial court awarded custody to Perales.890 On appeal, Rosenblum argued that the trial court’s
decision violated the law by taking into account his regular military deployments in determining
custody.891 The law mandated that “a parent's temporary duty, mobilization, or deployment to
military service and the resultant temporary disruption to the child of the parent may not be a
factor in a court's [custody] decision.”892 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision,
reasoning that “temporary” should be given its ordinary meaning.893 Therefore, Rosenblum’s
recurring deployment for a third of every year was not temporary because each deployment
continued beyond a limited period of time.894 Accordingly, it was also reasonable to conclude
that the disruption this deployment schedule would cause to his son would not be temporary.895
Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that a court is not barred from
considering a parent’s military deployment when resolving a custody dispute.896
Schaub v. Schaub
In Schaub v. Schaub,897 the supreme court held that laches do not bar the prospective division of
retirement benefits pursuant to a marriage dissolution.898 Theresa and “Hank” Schaub separated
in 1986.899 In 1992, Hank petitioned the court to dissolve their marriage, representing that he had
made diligent efforts but had been unable to locate Theresa.900 Subsequently, in 2010, Theresa
filed a motion seeking a post-decree equitable distribution of their property.901 On appeal, Hank
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raised the defense of laches because it had taken Theresa many years to petition the court.902 The
supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that laches did not bar the division
of Hank’s future retirement benefits.903 Here, Hank would not suffer unreasonable prejudice
from this prospective division, while Theresa would certainly be prejudiced if denied her
share.904 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that laches do not bar the
prospective division of retirement benefits to a marriage dissolution.905
Sherman v. State, Dep’t of Health and Social Services
In Sherman v. State, Dep’t of Health and Social Services,906 the supreme court held that parents
who neglect to comply with Office of Child Services (“OCS”) developed case plans may be
deemed to have failed to remedy previous abandonment of their child.907 In 2012, OCS took
custody of Sherman’s son, Kadin, after determining that both Kadin and his mother tested
positive for cocaine.908 OCS had previously removed Sherman’s other three children from his
care for the exact same reason.909 Soon thereafter, OCS developed a case plan wherein Sherman
could regain custody of Kadin if he submitted to psychological tests, provided OCS with housing
and income information and attended monthly case planning meetings.910 After refusing to
follow nearly every aspect of the case plan, the lower court terminated Sherman’s rights to
Kadin.911 On appeal, Sherman argued that he neither abandoned nor failed to remedy Kadin’s
abandonment.912 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that, in failing
to participate in nearly every aspect of the case plan, Sherman had both abandoned and failed to
remedy such abandonment913 The court further reasoned that this conclusion was only
strengthened by Sherman’s continued secrecy and recalcitrance towards OCS caseworkers.914
Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that parents who neglect to comply
with OCS developed case plans may be deemed to have failed to remedy previous abandonment
of their child.915
Swaney v. Granger
In Swaney v. Granger,916 the supreme court held that modification of child support orders in
existence before the initial motion for modification is served on the opposing party is
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improper.917 In 2005, the lower court granted Granger and Swaney a divorce and issued a child
custody and support order covering their four minor children.918 In 2008, Granger filed a motion
to modify the child custody and support order.919 The lower court subsequently granted the
motion.920 The court, however, only modified the custody aspect of the order, leaving the child
support aspect to be determined later.921 Three years later the lower court revisited the issue and
modified the child support aspect of the order as well, retroactively changing the amount of
several of the child support payments due to be paid before the motion for modification was
served on Swaney in 2008.922 On appeal, Swaney argued that modifying child support orders in
this manner violated Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 90.3.923 The supreme court reversed the
lower court’s decision, reasoning that Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 90.3 prohibited the
retroactive modification of existing child support orders for the period before the motion for
modification was served on the opposing party.924 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the
supreme court held that modification of child support orders in existence before the initial
motion for modification is served on the opposing party is improper.925
Urban v. Urban
In Urban v. Urban,926 the supreme court held that in a divorce proceeding, a court may rely on
property tax assessments over a real estate agent’s estimate.927 In their divorce proceeding,
Martha and Delbert Urban disagreed on the value of land they owned.928 The lower court
ultimately valued the couple’s property based on a tax assessment.929 On appeal, Delbert argued
that the superior court erred in its property valuation.930 The supreme court affirmed the lower
court’s decision, reasoning that since the lower court’s decision was reviewed for abuse of
discretion, its decision that the tax assessment was more reliable than the realtor’s opinion was
not reversible error.931 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that reliance
on tax valuation in regards to property appraisal is reasonable.932

917

Id. at 136.
Id. at 133.
919
Id. at 134.
920
Id.
921
Id.
922
Id.
923
Id. at 136.
924
Id.
925
Id.
926
314 P.3d 513 (Alaska 2013).
927
Id. at 515–16.
928
Id. at 514.
929
Id. at 515.
930
Id.
931
Id.
932
Id. at 515–16.
918

Wagner v. Wagner
In Wagner v. Wagner,933 the supreme court held that courts have a duty to inform a pro se litigant
of the proper procedure for an action when the litigant exhibits behavior that constitutes a lack of
familiarity with the rules.934 Felicia and Richard Wagner married in 1993.935 When Felicia filed
for divorce in 2010 there was a dispute about the division of marital property.936 Richard failed
to appear at three of the four pre-trial conferences and at trial but had called the court’s legal
secretary to ask for a continuance prior to three of his four absences.937 Richard’s requests were
never granted and he was never warned of the proper procedure for requesting a continuance.938
At trial, the court determined that, based on Richard’s repeated absence, it had no choice but to
determine that his absence from trial was voluntary and thus made several findings of fact and
conclusions of law based on Felicia’s testimony alone.939 On appeal, Richard argued that the
court erred in concluding that his absence was voluntary and in proceeding to trial without
him.940 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that Richard’s
continued attempts to request a continuance by calling the court’s secretary evidenced his belief
that he was utilizing the appropriate procedure.941 Based on this belief, combined with the fact
that the lower court never ordered Richard to cease calling for continuances or advised him that
he needed to file a motion for continuance, the court further reasoned that Richard’s behavior
constituted a lack of familiarity with the rules and thus was a legitimate request for
continuance.942 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held courts have a duty
to inform a pro se litigant of the proper procedure for an action when the litigant exhibits
behavior that constitutes a lack of familiarity with the rules.943
Wanner-Brown v. Brown
In Wanner-Brown v. Brown,944 the supreme court held that all retirement benefits vested during
the course of a marriage are considered marital property regardless of when the retirement
classification status was determined.945 Prior to his marriage, Conrad worked for the State in a
position with a retirement classification of Tier 1.946 He later left his position and cashed out his
retirement benefits.947 After his marriage to Tammy, Conrad again became employed by the
State and completely re-earned his retirement benefits during the course of the marriage.948
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While new employees at this time were classified as Tier 2, Conrad was able to retain his Tier 1
classification due to this prior employment with the State.949 The Tier 1 status allowed Conrad to
receive full retirement benefits five years earlier, resulting in an almost $80,000 increase in the
present value of his benefits.950 After Conrad filed for divorce, the lower court determined that
Conrad should be classified as a Tier 2 employee when determining the distribution of marital
assets because his Tier 1 status was acquired before the marriage.951 The supreme court reversed
the lower court’s decision, reasoning that all benefits obtained during a marriage are marital
property.952 As Conrad re-earned all his benefits during the marriage, his benefits should have
been classified as Tier 1 when determining the distribution of marital assets.953 Reversing the
lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that all retirement benefits vested during the
course of a marriage are considered marital property regardless of when the retirement
classification status was determined.954
Wilhour v. Wilhour
In Wilhour v. Wilhour,955 the supreme court held that factual disputes over a parent’s potential
future income necessitate an evidentiary hearing to determine child support payments.956 After
Joshua Wilhour relocated to move closer to his son, the lower court still used his previous
income to determine his child support payments.957 His new income following relocation was
substantially less than before, but Jacqueline Wilhour argued that the reduction was merely
temporary.958 On appeal, he argued that the factual dispute over his income necessitated an
evidentiary hearing that was denied by the lower court.959 The supreme court reversed the lower
court’s decision, reasoning that there was a genuine factual dispute over whether Joshua’s
income reduction was temporary or permanent.960 Additionally, according to the court, any
income change resulting from a parent moving closer to his or her child should rarely weigh
against that parent.961 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that factual
disputes over a parent’s potential future income necessitate an evidentiary hearing to determine
child support payments.962
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HEALTH LAW
Top
In re Stephen O.
In In re Stephen O.,963 the supreme court held that in an involuntary commitment hearing, the
court must consider whether the psychiatric patient is able to live safely outside of a controlled
environment.964 In 2004 Stephen had heard voices that made him fearful and led him to seriously
injure himself by jumping off a 16 to 18 foot ledge.965 In 2009, Stephen claimed he began
hearing the voice of Jesus telling him to repent and start attending church.966 Accordingly, the
lower court found Stephen gravely disabled and ordered his involuntary commitment to a mental
facility and for his involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs.967 The supreme court
reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that in determining whether a patient is severely
disabled, the court is not to consider if commitment would be preferable or in the patient’s best
interest but whether the patient can live safely without commitment.968 The lower court’s
reliance upon hearsay, the patient’s history involving markedly different symptoms and his
willingness to receive medical treatment all corroborate against a finding of being severely
disabled.969 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that in involuntary
commitment hearings, the court must consider whether the patient is able to live safely outside of
a controlled environment.970
IMMIGRATION LAW
Top
Villars v. Villars
In Villars v. Villars,971 the supreme court held that, as her immigration sponsor, a former
husband’s obligation to support his non-citizen ex-wife was correctly adjusted for the time
daughter did not live with the ex-wife, the ex-wife’s move to a different state and the ex-wife’s
earnings.972 Richard Villars sponsored Olga Villars’ immigration to America.973 The couple
ultimately divorced in 2009 with a decree maintaining his sponsoring obligation.974 Olga then
moved from Alaska to California and married Nasif in late 2009.975 From January to November
2010, Richard did not pay any support to Olga causing her to file a motion for those payments.976
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The lower court found that Olga was not owed that support, however.977 On appeal, Olga
challenged the lower court’s use of California’s lower federal poverty level, the time she and her
daughter had lived separately and her 2010 earnings in its calculations.978 The supreme court
affirmed the method used by the lower court, reasoning that support obligations must be adjusted
down when a family member leaves the household.979 Additionally, the court reasoned that the
applicable poverty level was the state where the potential recipient was currently living and that
support obligations should also be offset by any earned income.980 Affirming the lower court’s
calculation method, the supreme court held that, as her immigration sponsor, a former husband’s
obligation to support his non-citizen ex-wife was correctly adjusted.981
INSURANCE LAW
Top
Dearlove v. Campbell
In Dearlove v. Campbell,982 the supreme court held that voluntary pre-trial payments are
sometimes included in the recipient’s total recovery for purposes of Alaska Civil Rule 68
analysis.983 In a two-car collision, Dearlove, the driver of the first vehicle, collided with and
injured Campbell, a passenger in the second vehicle.984 Campbell’s insurance covered
Campbell’s medical bills of $20,000 and established a subrogation claim against Dearlove.985
Dearlove first offered to settle with Campbell for $18,000, but Campbell denied the offer
because it would have left her responsible for the subrogation claim.986 Subsequently, Dearlove’s
insurance company paid the subrogation claim of $20,000 to Campbell’s insurance company.987
Dearlove then made a second settlement offer of $5,000, which Campbell rejected as well.988 A
jury later returned a total award of $3,870 for Campbell and both parties claimed prevailing party
status and, accordingly, moved for attorneys’ fees under Rule 68.989 The lower court ruled that
Dearlove should be awarded attorney’s fees accrued after the second offer.990 On appeal,
Dearlove argued that she should be awarded attorney’s fees accrued after the first offer as
well.991 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that not including the
subrogation payment in Campbell’s total recovery to be compared to the first offer to determine
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if Dearlove was entitled to attorney’s fees could lead to abusive settlement practices.992 Thus,
according to the court, attorney’s fees accrued by Dearlove between her two settlement offers
was not available because Campbell’s recovery to be compared to Dearlove’s offer of $18,000
was $23,870.993 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that voluntary pretrial payments are sometimes included in the recipient’s total recovery for purposes of Rule 68
analysis.994
McDonnell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
In McDonnell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,995 the supreme court held that
personal injury claims are not subject to statutorily mandated appraisal under Alaska’s insurance
code.996 In 2007, McDonnell and her son were in a car accident.997 McDonnell claimed both her
and her son suffered back injuries from this accident.998 State Farm, McDonnell’s insurer,
however, did not believe the aforementioned accident was the source of all the claimed
injuries.999 Unable to settle, McDonnell asked for a declaratory judgment arguing that,
statutorily, her claims were entitled to mandatory appraisal.1000 Subsequently, the lower court
granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm.1001 On appeal, McDonnell argued again for
the application of mandatory appraisal to her claims.1002 The supreme court affirmed the lower
court’s decision, reasoning that the statutorily mandated appraisal applied to, among other things,
personal property.1003 Thus, according to the court, given the context, personal injury claims
were not included in personal property and, consequently, fell outside the statute’s bounds.1004
Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that personal injury claims are not
subject to statutorily mandated appraisal.1005
SOP, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Natural Resources
In SOP, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Natural Resources,1006 the supreme court held that a state park
issuing special use permits not revocable at will create unconstitutional easements over public
land.1007 The Nancy Lake State Recreation Area (the “Park”) granted numerous special use
permits that allowed private land owners to use ATVs on Park trails to access their remote
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properties.1008 As these properties became more populated, ATV usage rose considerably,
damaging the wildlife and vegetation surrounding the trails.1009 SOP, Inc. sued to enjoin the Park
from issuing these special use permits.1010 On appeal, the Park argued that the permits were mere
licenses within the scope of the Park’s authority to grant.1011 The supreme court reversed the
lower court’s decision, reasoning that the permits constituted appurtenant easements because the
permits were revocable only for cause and every remote private property owner who applied
received a permit on the basis of owning property in that area.1012 The court further reasoned
that, as easements, the permits constituted an impermissible, unconstitutional disposal of state
park land.1013 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that a state park
issuing special use permits not revocable at will create unconstitutional easements over public
land.1014
United Services Automobile Association v. Neary
In United Services Automobile Association v. Neary,1015 the supreme court held that the number
of insureds does not affect an explicit per-occurrence policy limit.1016 While handling his father’s
gun a minor accidently shot two friends with a single bullet, killing one and injuring the
other.1017 The parents of the victims sued the minor, his parents and their insurer, United Services
Automobile Association (“USAA”).1018 The parents’ plan, which covered themselves and their
son, included a limit of liability provision that limited the coverage of each occurrence to
$300,000.1019 The policy further stated that the total liability for USAA under the plan resulting
from any one occurrence would not be greater than that limit regardless of the number of
insureds.1020 The lower court held that each of the insureds were subject to an independent peroccurrence limit, resulting in potential liability of up to $900,000 for USAA.1021 On appeal,
USAA argued that the per-occurrence limit was not dependent on the number of insureds.1022
The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that while ambiguities should
be construed in favor of the insured, the language of this policy was clear and unambiguous.1023
Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the number of insureds does
not affect an explicit per-occurrence policy limit.1024
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MARITIME LAW
Top
Janes v. Alaska Railbelt Marine, LLC
In Janes v. Alaska Railbelt Marine, LLC,1025 the supreme court held that a plaintiff who asserts
that a shipowner’s failure to provide safer, alternative devices or methods that renders a vessel
unseaworthy bears the initial burden of proving that the alternative devices or methods are
feasible.1026 Janes, a railroad conductor, sued Alaska Railbelt Marine, LLC, for injuries he
suffered while loading railcars owned by the corporation onto a barge via a set of tracks.1027
Janes alleged that placing cargo onto the tracks and failing to provide devices to sTop moving
railcars from hitting the non-rail cargo made the barge unseaworthy.1028 At trial, the lower court
found that Janes had not demonstrated that safer alternatives for stopping the railcars existed,
and, consequently, his unseaworthiness claim must fail.1029 On appeal, Janes argued that the
lower court erred in requiring him to prove the feasibility of alternatives for stopping the
railcars.1030 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that because Janes’
theories of unseaworthiness posited that the barge was not reasonably fit due to the failure to
provide one of two alternative stopping devices, it was critical that the devices would work the
way that Janes claimed they would.1031 Thus, according to the court, since Janes’s
unseaworthiness claim depended on a showing that additional stopping devices were needed to
make the barge reasonably fit, Jane’s lack of demonstration was dispositive.1032 Affirming the
lower court, the supreme court held that a plaintiff who claims unseaworthiness based on a
shipowner’s failure to provide safer, alternative devices or methods bears the burden of proving
the feasibility of the alternative devices or methods.1033
PROPERTY LAW
Top
Beals v. Beals
In Beals v. Beals,1034 the supreme court held that absent evidence of intent to keep property
separate it will be considered marital.1035 The Bealses married in 2000 and divorced in 2011.1036
Prior to the marriage Mark Beals owned a home at 534 Second Avenue.1037 The couple
refinanced this home in order to convert $42,092 of equity to cash, which was used to purchase
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an adjacent lot.1038 Since this cash could be “easily tracked and separated from the marital
assets,” the lower court decided Mark was entitled to $42,092 of lot’s $45,000 worth.1039 On
appeal, Patricia argued that Mark had not presented evidence sufficient to characterize the
adjacent lot as separate property and was thus subject to marital distribution.1040 The supreme
court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that except where marriage is short and no
commingling of assets has occurred, property is presumed marital absent evidence of intent to
the contrary.1041 Here, the adjacent lot was titled in both Mark’s and Patricia’s names.1042
Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that absent evidence of an intent to
keep property separate the property will be considered marital.1043
Burke v. Maka
In Burke v. Maka,1044 the supreme court held that the doctrine of laches precludes a party from
challenging the validity of a covenant where the party knew of the shared use yet failed to assert
a right to exclusive use for more than four years.1045 Lot 9A shared a driveway with adjacent Lot
9B.1046 In 2001, the owner of both lots filed a covenant granting each lot access to a shared
driveway.1047 However, this covenant was not recorded until 2004.1048 The Burkes, purchased
Lot 9A in 2004.1049 Although they were unaware of the covenant, the Burkes stipulated that its
recording before the sale placed them on constructive notice.1050 Further, the Burkes did not
object when the owner of 9B utilized the shared driveway.1051 It was not until 2009 that the
Burkes contested the covenant, filing suit to quiet title, arguing that the covenant was invalid.1052
The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that evidence of the Burke’s
knowledge of the covenant combined with their failure to object to the shared use of the
driveway for more than four years constituted an unreasonable delay in seeking relief that
consequently prejudiced the owners of Lot 9B.1053 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the
supreme court held that the doctrine of laches precludes a party from challenging the validity of a
covenant where the party knew of the shared use yet failed to assert a right to exclusive use for
more than four years.1054
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Gefre v. Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP
In Gefre v. Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP,1055 the supreme court held that the ten-year statute of
limitations is inapplicable to tort claims that are merely attendant to an underlying claim
involving an ownership interest in property.1056 In response to Petro Alaska’s President and
majority shareholder personally acquiring a piece of property that was intended to belong to the
corporation, the corporation’s shareholders filed a derivative action for fiduciary fraud,
fraudulent conveyance, legal malpractice, and civil conspiracy against the corporation’s former
attorneys.1057 The superior court dismissed the shareholders’ derivative action, finding that the
claims were time-barred.1058 On appeal, the shareholders argued that the superior court erred in
refusing to apply a ten-year statute of limitations to the conspiracy and fraudulent conveyance
claims which were related to the acquisition of the property at issue.1059 The supreme court
affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the ten-year statute of limitations did not
apply to the civil conspiracy and fraudulent conveyance claims because the claims did not
directly involve the determination of a right or claim to or interest in the underlying real
property.1060 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the court held that the statute’s ten-year
limitations period does not apply to tort claims that are merely attendant to an underlying claim
involving a property interest.1061
Griffin v. Weber
In Griffin v. Weber,1062 the supreme court held that the burden of proof to reform a quitclaim
deed into a security agreement is met when both parties to the transaction testify that they
understood the deed’s purpose was to provide security for the transaction.1063 In 2009, Weber
agreed to cosign a refinanced mortgage that Griffin wanted to take out on her property.1064
Before taking out the mortgage, Griffin executed a quitclaim deed to transfer ownership of her
property from only herself to herself and Weber.1065 In 2010, Griffin wanted to refinance again,
this time with her fiancé as cosigner.1066 The bank asked that Weber relinquish his interest in the
property first, this dispute arose and Griffin asked the court to reform the 2009 deed into a
security instrument.1067 At trial, Griffin testified that a purpose of the transaction was to provide
security to Weber in case she defaulted on the mortgage.1068 Furthermore, Weber testified that
the purpose of the quitclaim deed was to secure his interest in the loan in case something
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happened to Weber.1069 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the
parties’ testimonies provided the clear and convincing evidence necessary to show that a security
was intended.1070 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the burden of
proof to reform a quitclaim deed into a security agreement is met when both parties to the
transaction testify that they understood the deed’s purpose was to provide security for the
transaction.1071
McCarrey v. Kaylor
In McCarrey v. Kaylor,1072 the supreme court held that the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act (“FLPMA”) does not terminate classifications created by the Small Tract Act.1073 The
Kaylors owned a property directly adjacent to a property owned by the McCarreys.1074 The
McCarreys’ property lot had its origins in the Small Tract Act, an act that authorized the sale of
public lands to private parties.1075 Furthermore, the deed accompanying the McCarrey lot
reserved a fifty-foot right-of-way that allowed access to a section of the Kaylor lot.1076
Eventually, the McCarreys planned to build a fence that would restrict the Kaylors use of the
right-of-way.1077 The Kaylors then commenced this action to establish a prescriptive easement
and obtain an injunction preventing the erection of the proposed fence.1078 On appeal, the
McCarreys argued that the right-of-way on their land was terminated when the Small Tract Act
was repealed by the FLPMA.1079 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision,
explaining that the right-of-way survived the repeal of the Small Tract Act because the FLPMA
did not explicitly terminate the classifications created by the Small Tract Act, one of which
formed the basis for this right-of-way.1080 The court further reasoned that such classifications
survived since the Bureau of Land Management’s regulations stated that the classifications
created by the Small Tract Act remained effective despite the Act’s repeal.1081 Furthermore, the
court noted that the FLPMA was limited in scope to public lands and that it probably did not
affect the private land interests involved here.1082 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the
supreme court held that the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (“FLPMA”) does not
terminate classifications created by the Small Tract Act.
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Schweitzer v. Salamatof Air Park Subdivision Owners, Inc.
In Schweitzer v. Salamatof Air Park Subdivision Owners, Inc.,1083 the supreme court held that the
determination of aircraft ownership is not preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration’s
(“FAA”) authority.1084 In 2010, Schweitzer filed a claim of exemption to prevent the seizure of
an incomplete airplane in his possession as satisfaction of Salamatof Air Park Subdivision
Owners, Inc.’s (the “Association”) monetary judgment against him.1085 Over Schweitzer’s
contentions that the plane was the property of a third party, the lower court determined that the
incomplete plane was salvaged from parts of one of Schweitzer’s planes and therefore was his
property.1086 On appeal, Schweitzer argued that the court could not make the ownership decision
because it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.1087 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s
decision, reasoning that the lower court did not need statutory authorization to rule as it did since
the court had the inherent power to resolve property ownership disputes.1088 The court further
reasoned that while federal regulations governed the assignment of identification by airplane
manufacturers, nothing in the regulations restricted the lower court’s power to look beyond the
airplane’s registration number to determine ownership.1089 Affirming the lower court’s decision,
the supreme court held that the determination of aircraft ownership is not preempted by the
FAA’s authority.1090
Stanhope v. Stanhope
In Stanhope v. Stanhope,1091 the supreme court held that in an equitable division of marital assets
proceeding, it is reasonable to award a contested marital residence to the party with the ability to
afford for the property’s upkeep and mortgage.1092 In 2010, Kenneth divorced his wife,
Maryna.1093 At the time of the divorce, Kenneth was disabled and considered unable to hold a
job, while Maryna worked as a janitor.1094 During proceedings to equally divide the marital
property, the superior court found that Maryna, due to her job, was in a better position to pay the
home’s mortgage and upkeep, awarding her the marital residence.1095 On appeal, Kenneth argued
that the lower court erred by awarding Maryna the residence because he was dependent on the
house.1096 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the lower court
did not abuse its discretion weighing the different factors in the case, ultimately awarding the
home to the person who could afford to maintain the residence.1097 Kenneth’s poor health,
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inability to work and destruction of a number of marital assets were properly weighed against
Maryna’s recent immigration, modest earning capacity as a janitor and lack of health
problems.1098 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that in an equitable
division of marital assets proceeding, it is reasonable to award the contested marital residence to
the party with the ability to afford for the property’s upkeep and mortgage.1099
Windel v. Mat-Su Title Insurance Agency, Inc.
In Windel v. Mat-Su Title Insurance Agency, Inc.,1100 the supreme court held that easements on
property owned by tenants by the entirety but missing a co-grantor’s signature can nonetheless
be valid.1101 Windel purchased a parcel of land from the Davises, tenants by the entirety who
jointly had recorded a fifty-foot-wide easement for a public road on the property.1102 Carnahan
purchased land adjacent to Windel’s property and upgraded the road.1103 Windel sued Carnahan
for trespass and argued that the easement was invalid.1104 The supreme court affirmed the lower
court’s decision, reasoning that despite Mrs. Davis’ absent signature on the easement’s
recording, the easement was valid under the doctrine of ratification.1105 Mrs. Davis’ silence
ratified the easement conveyance.1106 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court
held that easements on property owned by tenants by the entirety but missing a co-grantor’s
signature can nonetheless be valid.1107
TORT LAW
Top
Kalenka v. Jadon, Inc.
In Kalenka v. Jadon, Inc.,1108 the supreme court held that lack of direct evidence of a bar patron’s
intoxication is not necessarily fatal at the summary judgment stage to a claim under the dram
shop statute.1109 Morrell went drinking at a bar and fatally stabbed Kalenka in a fight later that
night.1110 Kalenka’s estate representative brought a wrongful death action against the bar,
claiming that the bar violated the dram shop statute by serving Morrell alcohol when he was
drunk.1111 Under the dram shop statute, a bar serving alcohol to a drunk patron is civilly liable
for damages caused by the patron’s intoxication.1112 Nevertheless, the bar won its summary
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judgment motion because there was no direct evidence of Morrell’s drunken state at the bar.1113
On appeal, Kalenka’s estate argued that a jury could have inferred that Morrell was visibly
intoxicated based on his later behavior.1114 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s
decision, reasoning that if an issue of material fact remained, summary judgment should not be
granted.1115 Here, according to the court, there was still the question of material fact regarding
whether the bar servers should have noticed Morrell’s intoxication.1116 Reversing the lower
court’s decision, the supreme court held that lack of direct evidence of a bar patron’s intoxication
is not necessarily fatal at the summary judgment stage to a claim under the dram shop statute.1117
Kennedy v. Municipality of Anchorage
In Kennedy v. Municipality of Anchorage,1118 the supreme court held that “garden-variety”
mental anguish claims do not waive physician and psychotherapist privileges.1119 Two former
police officers brought claims against the Municipality of Anchorage for racial discrimination,
claiming damages for mental anguish.1120 The Municipality sought discovery concerning the
nature of the officers’ mental anguish claims, requesting the officers’ medical and counseling
records.1121 Subsequently, the lower court granted the Municipality’s motion to compel.1122 On
appeal, the officers argued that claims for the sort of mental anguish that any normal person
would experience under the circumstances did not place their emotional conditions at issue, and,
accordingly, did not waive the privilege that protected these records during discovery.1123 The
supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that although discovery of a
patient’s medical records may be compelled when serious psychological conditions such as
depression are claimed, similar compulsion would not be granted for garden-variety mental
anguish claims, such as claims of anger, disappointment and sadness.1124 Reversing the lower
court’s decision, the supreme court held that “garden-variety” mental anguish claims do not
waive physician and psychotherapist privileges.1125
Lum v. Koles
In Lum v. Koles,1126 the supreme court held that unlawful entry by a police officer does not make
any subsequent use of force per se unreasonable.1127 After receiving a domestic disturbance
emergency telephone call from a third party, police officers entered the Lum’s apartment without
1113
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knocking or announcing their presence.1128An altercation ensued and the police officers pepper
sprayed and handcuffed Daniel Lum.1129 After the Lums sued the officers for excessive force and
unlawful entry, the lower court granted summary judgment for the officers based on qualified
immunity.1130 On appeal, the Lums argued that the unlawful entry and subsequent acts of force
should be considered together, defeating the officers’ qualified immunity by making their use of
force per se unreasonable.1131 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning
that, in an excessive force analysis, the court must look solely at the use of force at the time the
force was applied.1132 Thus, according to the court, unlawful entry does not make applied force
per se unreasonable and, consequently, the force ultimately used here was reasonable at the time
it was applied.1133 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that unlawful
entry by a police officer does not make any subsequent use of force per se unreasonable.1134
Maness v. Daily
In Maness v. Daily,1135 the supreme court held that qualified immunity protected state troopers
from excessive force claims.1136 Maness had fled from state troopers, who pursued him until a
police department officer shot him non-fatally.1137 Subsequently, Maness brought claims of
excessive force against the troopers.1138 Finding the troopers were public servants protected by
qualified immunity, the lower court granted summary judgment.1139 On appeal, Maness argued
that officers may be liable for excessive force if they violate the Fourth Amendment by
provoking a violent confrontation.1140 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision,
reasoning that qualified immunity protected police officers’ exercise of discretionary
functions.1141 The court further reasoned that, regarding excessive force claims, the officer’s
conduct must be objectively reasonable or he must reasonably believe his conduct was lawful
from the perspective of a reasonable officer.1142 Here, the troopers’ actions were objectively
reasonable.1143 Affirming that lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that qualified
immunity protected state troopers from excessive force claims.1144
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Wiersum v. Harder
In Wiersum v. Harder,1145 the supreme court held that landowners do not have a duty to their
neighbors to prevent unreasonable risks of harm caused by third parties.1146 Harder brought a
timber trespass action against his neighbors, the Wiersums, seeking damages after he discovered
that the Wiersums had cut down trees on his property.1147 In their answer, the Wiersums filed a
third-party complaint against a another neighbor, Wietfeld, alleging that she negligently
misrepresented to the Wiersums that she owned the property in between her home and their
home and granted them permission to cut down the trees.1148 The lower court dismissed the claim
against Wietfeld holding that she did not owe a duty to the Wiersums.1149 On appeal, the
Wiersums argued that Wietfeld was liable because she negligently misrepresented or failed to
disclose information to the Wiersums and that Wietfeld owed a broad duty to her neighbors to
prevent unreasonable risks of harm.1150 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision,
reasoning that claims for negligent misrepresentation and failure to disclose require a business
transaction between the parties, which was not present in this case.1151 The court further reasoned
that Wietfeld owed no broad duty of care to her neighbors since there was no statute, regulation,
contract or case law supporting such a liability theory.1152 Affirming the lower court’s decision,
the supreme court held that landowners do not have a duty to their neighbors to prevent
unreasonable risks of harm caused by third parties.1153
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